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1. PURPOSE 
A design methodology for the waste packages and ancillary components, viz., the emplacement 
pallets and drip shields, has been developed to provide designs that satisfy the safety and 
operational requirements of the Yucca Mountain Project. This methodology is described in the 
Waste Package Design Methodology Report (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 166 1681. To demonstrate the 
practicability of this design methodology, four waste package design configurations have been 
selected to illustrate the application of the methodology. These four design configurations are 
the 21-pressurized water reactor (PWR) Absorber Plate waste package, the 44-boiling water 
reactor (BWR) waste package, the 5-defense high-level waste (DHLW)/United States (U.S.) 
Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) Co-disposal Short waste package, and the 
Naval Canistered SNF Long waste package. Also included in this demonstration is the 
emplacement pallet and continuous drip shield. 
The purpose of this report is to document how that design methodology has been applied to the 
waste package design configurations intended to accommodate naval canistered SNF. This 
demonstrates that the design methodology can be applied successfully to this waste package 
design configuration and support the License Application for construction of the repository. In 
this document, the results of design calculations are summarized and used to show that the 
design configurations are in compliance with the applicable criteria in Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Waste Package System Description Document (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654271) and Project Design 
Criteria Document (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 16 13621). 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
The naval waste packages are classified as Safety Category items (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1651791, 
Table A-2, p. A-4). Therefore, this document is subject to the requirements of Quality 
Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2003 [DIRS 1629031). This document was 
developed in accordance with AP-3.124, Design Calculations and Analyses. 
3. USE OF SOFTWARE 
No computer software or models were used in the generation of this report. Contributory 
calculations provide descriptions of software used. 
4. DESIGN INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Generic design inputs and assumptions that are used in contributory calculations to this report 
may be found in Waste Package Component Design Methodology Report (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 
1661681, Sections 4 and 5). Specific design inputs and assumptions may be found in the 
supporting calculations. 
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5. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
5.1 GENERAL CONFIGURATION 
Section 114(a)(l)(B) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 
10134(a)(l)(B)) (NWPA 1982 [DIRS 101681]), requires "a description of the waste form or 
packaging proposed for use at such repository, and an explanation of the relationship between 
such waste form or packaging and the geologic medium of the site." This section describes the 
waste forms to be disposed, along with their packaging. -An explanation of the important 
parameters considered in the design of the waste package is included in this section, as is a 
summary of the expected performance of the waste package design. This section: 
Presents an overview of the waste forms and the waste package design configurations 
Describes the waste package, its design bases, and its functions 
Discusses in detail the waste forms, the parameters considered in designing the waste 
package (and its variations), and the evaluations performed on the designs 
Describes the material selection and fabrication of the waste package 
Presents the results of design evaluations of the waste package. 
Waste Form Overview-Waste forms to be received and packaged for disposal include spent 
nuclear fuel fiorn commercial power reactors, spent nuclear fuel owned by the DOE (including 
naval fuel), and canisters of solidified high-level radioactive waste from prior commercial and 
defense fuel reprocessing operations. 
Section 114(d) of the NWPA (42 U.S.C. 10134(d)) (NWPA 1982 [DIRS 1016811) limits the first 
repository's capacity to no more than 70,000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) "...until such 
time as a second repository is in operation." The types of waste that will be accepted at the 
repository have been allocated as follows (DOE 2002 [DIRS 1559701, Chapter 2): 
63,000 MTHM of commercial spent nuclear fuel 
7,000 MTHM of DOE high-level radioactive waste, commercial high-level radioactive 
waste, and DOE spent nuclear fuel. 
The waste forms received at a repository will be in solid form. Materials that could ignite or 
react chemically at a level that would compromise containment or isolation will not be accepted 
by the repository. Neither the waste forms nor the waste packages will contain free liquids that 
could compromise waste containment. Materials that are regulated as hazardous waste under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. [DIRS 1039361) will 
not be disposed in the repository. 
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Waste Package Overview-The design of a waste package is based on the characteristics of the 
waste forms that it will hold. Because commercial and DOE high-level radioactive waste forms 
have similar characteristics, both may be placed into a waste package of the same design. This 
has allowed the DOE to design waste packages capable of accommodating all the types of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste currently generated or anticipated in the United 
States, whether commercial or governmental. 
The waste package has been designed, in conjunction with the natural and other engineered 
barriers, to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
regulations, to contribute to safe operations during the preclosure phase, to make efficient use of 
the repository area, and to preserve the option of retrieving the waste. To perform its 
containment and isolation functions, the waste package described in this report has been 
designed to take advantage of a location in the unsaturated zone. 
All the waste package design configurations consist of two concentric cylinders in which the 
waste forms will be placed. The inner cylinder will be composed of stainless steel type 316 
(Unified Numbering System [UNS] S31600). The outer cylinder will be made of a corrosion- 
resistant nickel-based alloy, Alloy 22 @INS N06022). The waste package design configurations 
for naval spent nuclear fuel are larger in diameter and thicker than' those for commercial spent 
nuclear fuel. The outer layer of corrosion-resistant material protects the underlying layer of 
structural material from corrosion, and the structural material supports the thinner material of the 
outer layer. 
Each waste package design configuration has outer and inner lids. The outer (closure) lids will 
be made of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). The inner lids will be made of stainless steel type 316 
(UNS S31600), and their thickness will vary, depending on the waste package design 
configuration. The final closure weld of the Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) outer lid undergoes stress- 
mitigation to inhibit stress corrosion cracking. Since this mitigation cannot easily be performed 
through the entire thickness of the outer lid, an Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) lid on the closure end of 
the waste package (middle lid) provides additional protection against stress corrosion cracking in 
the closure weld area. 
Before the double-walled waste package is sealed, helium will be added as a fill gas. The helium 
will prevent oxidation of the waste form (e.g., naval SNF canister, uncanistered commercial fuel, 
etc.) and help transfer heat from the waste form to the wall of the inner vessel of the waste 
package. Transferring heat away from the waste form is an important means of controlling waste 
form temperatures and preserving the integrity of the metal cladding on the fuel elements, thus 
extending the life of an existing barrier to water infiltration. 
All waste package design configurations will use a remote lifting-and-handling mechanism. The 
collar-sleeve-and-trunnion joint apparatus will, allow the necessary .handling of the waste 
package before it is placed on an emplacement pallet and transferred to the designated drift. Each 
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waste package will also have a unique permanent label (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1666111, Section 
6.4.2). 
Although they share the features described previously, the waste package design configurations 
have different internal components to accommodate the different waste forms. For example, the 
waste package for uncanistered commercial spent nuclear fuel has an internal basket assembly to 
support fuel assemblies. In other waste packages (e.g., the high-level radioactive waste and DOE 
spent nuclear fuel waste packages), the internal basket has a different design, or, as is the case 
with naval spent nuclear fuel, the basket is contained inside the canister. 
5.1.1 General Design Basis for the Waste Package 
The waste isolation system is an important element of a repository. The primary component of 
the system is the waste package. As defined in 10 CFR 63.2 (66 FR 55732 [DIRS 1566711, a 
waste package includes the waste form and any containers, shielding, packing, and other 
absorbent materials immediately surrounding it. The invert material does not immediately 
surround the waste package, so it is not considered part of the waste package. Figure 1 illustrates 
the waste package within the emplacement drift of the waste isolation system. 
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events that have at least 1 chance in 10,000 of occurring before permanent closure of the 
repository) 10 CFR 63.2 (66 FR 55732 [DIRS 1566711). 
These event sequences and their effects on performance were defined by reviewing the results of 
Preliminary Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
1641281, Section 6) constituting a bounding list of preclosure event sequences that could affect 
the waste packages. Using this list, engineers performed structural, thermal, and criticality 
analyses of the impacts such events could have on waste package performance. 
5.1.3 Postclosure Performance Specification 
10 CFR 63.1 13(b) (10 CFR 63 [DIRS 1585351) requires the entire repository system to meet 
specific dose limits for 10,000 years. The waste package is one of many barriers relied upon to 
meet this limit. The DOE'S objective is to design a waste package that works in concert with the 
natural environment to meet performance standards while reducing the uncertainty associated 
with the current understanding of natural processes at the site. 
5.1.4 Design Descriptions 
An analysis was undertaken to determine the number of design configurations needed to handle 
the different waste forms that will constitute the anticipated waste stream in the most economical 
manner (CRWMS M&O 1997 [DIRS 1002241). The objective of the evaluation was to 
determine: 
The number of different waste package design configurations needed 
The capacity of each waste package design configuration (i.e., the amount of waste it 
will hold) 
The limits on spent nuclear fuel properties (e.g., age, thermal characteristics) that might 
apply to each waste package design configuration. 
The complete system of waste package design configurations is intended to allow reliable 
disposal of those waste forms that a repository will accept while still enhancing overall 
efficiencies. 
To determine the most efficient set of waste package design configurations for commercial spent 
nuclear fuel, the DOE designed waste packages of various assembly-holding capacities and 
incorporated into the design methods for removing decay heat and preventing criticality. This 
resulted in the selection of a set of five waste package design configurations as the most efficient 
means of accommodating the anticipated waste stream of commercial spent nuclear fuel. A 
similar process led to three configurations for DOE non-naval spent nuclear fuel and DOE and 
commercial high-level radioactive waste. Two other configurations are specific to naval spent 
nuclear fuel, which will arrive presealed in canisters (Macheret 2001 [DIRS 1546241, Sections 
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4.2 and 4.3). Some DOE non-naval spent nuclear fuel will be loaded into waste packages with 
high-level radioactive waste; this DOE spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste will 
also arrive in presealed canisters. 
5.1.5 U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste 
Nine types of canisters of DOE spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste may be 
received at the repository (Macheret 2001 [DIRS 1546241, Sections 4.2 and 4.3): 
1. Naval spent nuclear fuel canisters, short 
2. Naval spent nuclear fuel canisters, long 
3. DOE spent nuclear fuel canisters, short 
4. DOE spent nuclear fuel canisters, long 
5. Larger-diameter DOE spent nuclear fuel canisters, short 
6. Larger-diameter DOE spent nuclear fuel canisters, long 
7. Solidified high-level radioactive waste canisters, short 
8. Solidified high-level radioactive waste canisters, long 
9. Multicanister overpacks containing spent nuclear fuel from the Hanford N Reactor. 
The number of canisters of solidified high-level radioactive waste will greatly exceed the number 
of canisters of DOE spent nuclear fuel. Therefore, the DOE has developed an efficient 
arrangement for packing them together (Macheret 2001 [DIRS 1546241, Section 4.2). This 
mixing of DOE spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is called "co-disposal." Co- 
disposal also helps maintain criticality control for DOE spent nuclear fuel that contains highly 
enriched uranium. Naval spent nuclear fuel canisters, which are larger in diameter, will not be 
placed in co-disposal waste packages; they will be placed one canister per waste package. 
5.1.6 U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel 
DOE spent nuclear fuel has a wide variety of physical, chemical, and nuclear characteristics and 
represents an inventory of approximately 2,500 MTHM; 2,333 MTHM of this is included in the 
waste allocation for disposal in the first repository (DOE 2002 [DIRS 1584051, Section 8.1). 
The waste packages designed for DOE spent nuclear fuel will accept fuel irradiated at DOE 
facilities, naval spent nuclear fuel, and certain types of material irradiated at commercial nuclear 
reactors, including debris from the Three Mile island-2 reactor and fuel from the Fort Saint Vrain 
reactor. All DOE waste canisters will be sealed before they are transported to the repository. 
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Naval nuclear fuel is designed to operate in a high-temperature, high-pressure environment for 
many years. Naval fuel is highly enriched. To ensure it can withstand battle-shock loads, naval 
fuel is surrounded by large amounts of structural material made of Zircaloy. There are two 
canister designs for naval fuel; both use similar materials and mechanical arrangements. The 
DOE plans to emplace about 65 MTHM of naval spent nuclear fuel in the repository. This fuel 
will be contained within about 300 sealed canisters, which will be transferred directly from 
transport casks into waste packages (DOE 2002 [DIRS 1584051, Appendix C, Section 5.1, 
Table 1. 
5.2 NAVAL WASTE PACKAGE CONFIGURATIONS 
Naval spent nuclear fuel arrives at the repository in canisters suitable for long-term disposal. 
The canisters fit one to a waste package. Because the naval fuel arrives in canisters of two sizes 
(one short and one long), the DOE has developed two waste package design configurations for it. 
The larger of these two types is the heaviest and longest of all the waste packages design 
configurations. No additional features are necessary for structural support, heat transfer, and 
criticality control. The two waste package configurations and dimensions are provided by the 
following drawings: 
Naval Long Waste Package ConJiguration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648541). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1581) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 159]), respectively. 
Naval Short Waste Package Configuration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648551). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1601) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 161]), respectively. 
There are a number of major components that comprise the waste package. A standard 
nomenclature has been established for referring to these components. This nomenclature is 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Standard Nomenclature for Waste Package Components 
Preferred Terminology Acceptable for Clarity 
or Brevity Description 
Trunnion Sleeve Trunnion Collar Sleeve The welded attachment that accepts the trunnion collar 
Trunnion Collar The removable ring that mates with the trunnion sleeve 
Outer Barrier Outer Corrosion Barrier 22 Shell 
The Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) shell (sides and the outer 
corrosion barrier bottom lid) 
Outer Lid Final Alloy 22 Lid The outermost lid, Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) 
Middle Lid An Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) lid, the middle of three lids 
Spread Rings The four-part ring that, when spread into position, mechanically holds the inner vessel lid in place 
Inner Vessel Lid Inner Lid The stainless steel lid that seals the Inner Vessel 
lnner Vessel The inner vessel that is the ASME B&PV code-stamped Stainless Steel Vessel 
reSSure vessel 
Shell Interface Ring The stainless deel ring that sits between the support ring and the inner vessel 
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Preferred Terminology Acceptable for Clarity or Brevity Description 
Inner Vessel Support The Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) ring that keeps the inner 
Ring vessel off of the bottom of the outer corrosion barrier 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1671671, Appendix D 
5.3 JUSTIFICATION OF DESIGN FEATURES 
The owter lid is designed with a flat top. This is a result of the value engineering study in Value 
Study Report- Waste Package Reevaluation (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1631851, Attachment 1111). The 
owter lid weld is laser peened or burnished to reduce residual stresses (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
1672781, Section 4.1.1.6). The middle lid, with its own separate weld, provides another level of 
protection, serving as a defense in depth feature. 
The bottom trunnion sleeve is extended past the outer corrosion barrier to act as an energy 
absorber in case of an accident. The part that extends has a tapered surface to allow runoff when 
the waste package is horizontal. 
For ease of assembly, the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier has a gap in between, both 
radially and axially. The axial gap is at least 10 mm (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1616911, Section 7, 
p. 13), and the radial gap will be at least 1 mm (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551, Tables 4 and 5, 
p. 13). These distances account for differences in thermal expansion values for Alloy 22 (UNS 
N06022) and stainless steel type 316 (UNS S31600). 
The shell interface ring is added as a measure to absorb energy during the comer drop load case. 
Its placement alleviates high stresses from occurring in the inner vessel bottom corner (CRWMS 
M&O 2000 [DIRS 1578221, Section 6, p. 15). 
The support ring is added to prevent the weight of the he1 from creating a force in the middle of 
the bottom lid of the outer corrosion barrier when the waste package is in the vertical position. 
The support ring elevates the inner vessel and prevents it from contacting the owter corrosion 
barrier. 
5.3.1 Dimensions 
The cavity lengths and diameters for the naval long and short waste packages are determined 
from the overall dimensions of the naval SNF canisters. Since there are two canister lengths 
(Naples 1999 [DIRS 1099881, Enclosure 3, p. 2) there are two waste package configurations to 
accommodate them. The cavity length of the waste packages is approximately 12.7 mm (0.5 in.) 
greater than the length of the naval canisters. For the naval long waste package the cavity length 
is 5.398 m (212.5 in.), and for the naval short waste package the cavity length is 4.763 m 
(187.5 in.). Since both canisters share a common overall diameter, the waste package cavity 
diaineter for both configurations is 1.702 m (67.0 in.), allowing 12.7 mm (0.5 in.) of diameter ' 
clearance. Dimensions of the two waste packages can be found in the following drawings: 
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Naval Long Waste Package Configuration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648541). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1581) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 159]), respectively. 
Naval Short Waste Package Configuration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648551). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1601) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 16 I]), respectively. 
I 5.3.2 Material Selection 
The selection of materials from which reliable waste packages could be fabricated followed a 
multistep analysis and design process. It began by analyzing the critical functions of a particular 
waste package and its various components. In selecting a material for a component, the 
designers considered both the material's availability and the critical functions the component will 
serve as part of the waste package. Eight major components and eight performance criteria were 
identified for selecting fabricating materials (CRWMS M&O 1997 [DIRS 1002591, Section 3). 
The eight major components are: 
Structural vessel 
Corrosion-resistant barrier 
Fill gas 
Interlocking plates for commercial design configurations 
Fuel tubes for commercial design configurations 
Structural guides for commercial design configurations 
Guide tube for co-disposal design configurations 
Thermal shunts for commercial design configurations. 
Not every waste package design configuration requires all of these components; it varies 
according to the waste form each will hold. However, all eight of these components cover the 
major requirements of all ten waste package design configurations. 
I The eight criteria that contribute to performance are: 
Mechanical performance (strength) 
Chemical performance (resistance to corrosion and microbial attack) 
Predictability of performance (understanding the behavior of materials) 
Compatibility with materials of the waste package and waste form 
Ease of fabrication using the material 
Previous experience (proven performance record) 
Thermal performance (heat distribution characteristics) 
Neutronic performance (criticality and shielding). 
I Reasonableness of cost was considered as a discriminator. 
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Corrosion-Resistant Materials-Corrosion performance has been determined to be the most 
important criterion for a long waste package lifetime. Essential performance qualities therefore 
include a material's resistance to general and localized corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and 
hydrogen-assisted cracking and embrittlement. The effects of long-term thermal aging are also 
important. To address the performance requirements for the waste package, the DOE has 
initiated studies to gain a better understanding of the processes involved in predicting the rate of 
waste package material corrosion over the 10,000-year regulatory period. 
Combinations and arrangements of materials as containment barriers were carefully considered 
from several perspectives. In the process, analysts considered such criteria as (1) material 
compatibility (e.g., galvanic/crevice corrosion effects); (2) the material's ability to contribute to 
defense in depth (e.g., because it has a different failure mode from other barriers); (3) the 
material's ease of fabrication; and (4) the potential impact of thin, corrosion-resistant materials 
used as containment barriers on a repository's essential operations, such as waste package 
loading, handling, and emplacement. 
The major objectives centered on understanding the temperature and humidity conditions that 
exist at different times for a range of thermal operating modes in a particular unsaturated zone, 
then designing the waste packages accordingly. Since the properties of any material selected for 
a corrosion barrier will inevitably be influenced by the temperature and humidity conditions in a 
repository of a particular design at a particular site, selecting the right corrosion-resistant 
material became one of the most important priorities. 
After assessing potential materials available for waste package corrosion barriers, analysts 
selected nickel- and titanium-based alloys as the most promising candidate materials for 
corrosion resistance in an oxidizing environment. Using a corrosion-resistant material as the 
outer corrosion barrier of the waste package significantly lowers the risk of waste package failure 
from corrosion. Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) was selected as the preferred material for the outer 
corrosion barrier because it has excellent resistance to corrosion in the environment expected at 
Yucca Mountain; it is easier to weld than titanium; and it has a better thermal expansion 
coefficient match to stainless steel type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600) than titanium. A structurally strong 
material (stainless steel) was chosen for the inner layer of the waste package (CRWMS M&O 
2000 [DIRS 1381731, Section 7.6). 
Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) also offers benefits in the areas of program and operating flexibility. It 
is extremely corrosion-resistant under conditions of high temperature and low humidity, such as 
those that will prevail for hundreds to thousands of years in a repository designed to allow a 
relatively high thermal output from the waste packages. 
Structural Materials-The major functional requirement of the structural material for the inner 
layer of the waste package is to support the corrosion-resistant outer material. Stainless steel 
type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600) was selected for the structural layer (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 
13 8 1731, Section 5.2). This material provides the required strength; has a better compatibility 
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with Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) than carbon steel; and provides an economical solution to 
functional requirements. Table 2 presents the yield and tensile strengths of Alloy 22 (UNS 
N06022) and stainless steel type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600). 
Table 2. Yield and Tensile Strengths of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) and Stainless Steel Type 316 (UNS 
S3 1 600) 
Alloy 22 (UNS Stainless Steel Type 
N06022) 316 (UNS S31600) 
Engineering 
Tensile 
Strength (S,,) 
- 
True Tensile 204°C ' 926 675 
Strength (0") 300°C 910 61 9 
31 6 " ~  ' 885 673 
31fi°CI 91 I 61 9 
NOTES: RT = room temperature. 
a BSC 2002 [DIRS 1623461, Section 5.1. 
BSC 2003 [DIRS 1623461, Section 5.1.2. 
BSC 2003 [DIRS 1658951, Section 5.1. 
BSC 2003 [DIRS 1658951, Section 5.1.2. 
ASME 2003 [DIRS 1581 151, Section II, Part D, Tables Y-1 and U. 
BSC 2002 [DIRS 1618801, Section 5.2.2. 
With Modified Elongation, BSC 2002 [DIRS 1618801, Section 5.2.2. 
The fill gas can be a significant conductor of heat from the waste form to the internal basket, so 
thermal performance was deemed one of the most important criteria in choosing a gas. The fill 
gas should not degrade other components of the waste package, so compatibility with other 
materials was another important criterion. Helium is inert and is routinely used as the fill gas for 
fuel rods, which indicates that helium will have an excellent compatibility with spent nuclear 
fuel. Based on a review of data on thermal conductivity, it was chosen over other candidate 
gases, such as nitrogen, argon, and krypton (CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1381921, Sections 
3.3.1 through 3.3.3). 
5.3.3 ASME Code Position 
The basis for the selection and application of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code to the waste package is documented in the 
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document entitled, BSC Position on the Use of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for 
the Yucca Mountain Waste Packages (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1650581). This section summarizes the 
salient points of that document with regard to the design of the waste packages. 
Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 1632741) provides specific 
guidance on the appropriateness of using the ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151) 
in the design of waste packages (e.g., Section 2.1.1.7.2.3 (1)); however, it does not prescribe the 
exact implementation of the ASME B&PV Code. 
In any discussion of the ASME B&PV Code, it is important to first note that it is a pressure 
vessel safety code and that its primary mission is to assure structural adequacy for pressure 
loading. Any other use of the ASME B&PV Code, such as the use of the conservative material 
properties contained in it or failure limits for non-pressure loading, must be justified on insight 
into the structural phenomena that are postulated to occur. For the waste packages, component 
sizing and thickness are not determined by pressure loads but rather by dynamic events that the 
waste package might experience. Therefore, the application of the ASME B&PV Code design 
rules for dynamic loading of the waste packages must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the 
rules are properly applied. The preparation of that document is described in BSC Position on the 
Use of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for the Yucca Mountain Waste Packages 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 1650581). 
For the application of the ASME B&PV code, Section 111, Division I, Subsection NC (ASME 
2001 [DIRS 158 1 15]), has been selected by Bechtel SAIC Company (BSC) for the code- 
compliant design and fabrication of the waste packages. It is important to differentiate the parts 
of the waste package to which the code apply. There are four major assembled components of 
the waste package. These are (1) the stainless steel type 3 16 inner vessel, (2) the Alloy 22 (UNS 
N06022) outer corrosion barrier, (3) the internal basket assemblies, and (4) the removable 
trunnion collar that is used for lifting and handling purposes. With regard to the code design, the 
only one of these parts that is considered a pressure vessel is the stainless steel type 316 inner 
vessel. 
With regard to the hermeticity of the inner vessel and integrity of the same against pressure 
loads, no currently postulated dynamic structural event involves simultaneous over- 
pressurization of the inner vessel. For over-pressurization, the capability of the spread ring and 
seal weld combination to retain the design pressure is assured by a helium leak check. While the 
seal welds are anticipated to be sound welds, no credit for resistance against dynamic events is 
taken, as these are partial-penetration welds. Therefore, for dynamic structural events where the 
inner vessel in the vicinity of the seal welds may be reasonably anticipated to experience 
significant loads, these welds are not credited to maintain the hermeticity of the inner vessel. In 
such cases, it must be shown that the outer corrosion barrier does not breach to maintain 
containment of the waste form. 
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For the other components of the waste package, the ASME B&PV code is only used as guidance, 
either through the use of conservative material properties or conservative stress limits. For 
credible preclosure event sequences and the assessment of those event sequences, the code and 
supporting code interpretations are used to formulate layered defensible material failure criteria. 
The basis for these failure criteria is discussed in Section 7.1.2.3.1.2. 
It should be noted that if a waste package suffers a nontrivial dynamic event (i.e., drop, tip-over, 
etc.), the waste form would be repackaged in a new waste package and the original waste 
package permanently removed from service. 
6. SUMMARY OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
Preclosure and postclosure requirements are discussed in this section. Functional requirements 
are taken from Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package System Description Document (BSC 
2003 [DIRS 1654271). The applicability of the functional requirement for compliance 
demonstration by Waste Package and Components is also noted. 
6.1 PRECLOSURE 
6.1.1 Normal Operations 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.3.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Waste Package Handling Limits 
Functional Requirement Text: Waste package handling shall not introduce any surface defect in 
the corrosion barrier exceeding those identified by performance assessment and on interface 
exchange drawings. Surface defects include, but are not limited to, scratches, nicks, dents, and 
permanent changes to the surface stress condition (Table 3). 
Table 3. Waste Package Handling Limits Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
1 This issue is under investigation and will be resolved prior to construction authorization. Yes 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.3.2 
Functional Requirement Title: Waste Package Closure 
Functional ~ e ~ u i r e m e n t  Text: sealing' operations shall be performed on the waste package 
(Table 4). 
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Table 4. Waste Package Closure Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
1 Waste package sealing operations shall meet the requirements for the waste package as specified in the SDD for the waste package closure system. Yes 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.2.1.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Allowance for Decontamination of Surfaces 
Functional Requirement Text: The waste package shall have surfaces that can be reasonably 
decontaminated (Table 5). 
Table 5. Allowance for Decontamination of Surfaces Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
1 Performance requirements will be developed prior to license application. Yes 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.3.1.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Primary Configuration and Materials 
Functional Requirement Text: The waste package shall be constructed in two primary 
components consisting of an inner vessel and an outer corrosion barrier (Table 6). 
Table 6. Primary Configuration and Materials Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
1 The waste package inner vessel shall have one lid and be made of stainless steel type 316 (UNS S31600). Yes 
2 The waste package outer corrosion barrier shall have two lids and be made of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). Yes 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.3.2.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Nuclear Material Control and Accountability 
Functional Requirement Text: The waste package shall have a means to maintain nuclear 
material control and accountability (Table 7). 
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Table 7. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Performance Requirements 
6.1.1.1 Thermal 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text 
Number 
1 Performance requirements will be developed prior to license application. 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.1.5 
Applicability 
Yes 
Functional Requirement Title: Postclosure Primary Performance 
Functional Requirement Text: The waste package shall be designed so that, working in 
combination with natural barriers and other engineered barriers, the radiological exposures to the 
reasonably maximally exposed individuals are within the limits established through 10 CFR 
63.1 13(b) [DIRS 1585351, and the release of radionuclides into the accessible environments are 
within the limits established through 10 CFR 63.1 13(c) [DIRS 1585351 (Table 8). 
Table 8. Postclosure Primary Performance Requirements 
The thermal calculations for normal operations are performed continuously through preclosure 
and postclosure times. The maximum heat expected in a naval waste package is 8.51 kW 
(McKenzie 2001 [DIRS 15805 11, Table 2), much lower than the general limit placed on all waste 
packages of 11.8 kW. Maximum surface temperatures of the naval canisters are dependent on 
heat flux as shown below (Naples 1999 [DIRS 1099881, Table 6). These maximum canister 
surface temperatures are not requirements placed on the naval spent fuel canister. 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text 
Number 
1 The maximum waste package power at emplacement is 11.8 kW. 
Heat Flux (kw/m2) Maximum Canister Surface Temperature ("C) 
Applicability 
Yes 
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6.1.1.2 Structural 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.1.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Preclosure Containment 
Functional Requirement Text: The waste package contains the waste form within its boundary 
for the preclosure period (Table 9). 
Table 9. Preclosure Containment Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
1 The sealed waste package shall not breach during normal operations or during Yes credible preclosure event sequences. 
2 The waste package shall be designed and constructed to the codes and standards specified in (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Section 5.1 .I .) Yes 
3 Normal operations and credible event sequence load combinations are defined in (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Table 5.1.1-1). Yes 
The waste package shall be designed to permit retrieval during the preclosure 
4 period until the completion of a performance confirmation program and Yes 
commission review of the information obtained from such a program. 
The waste package shall be designed to permit retrieval during the preclosure 
period so that any or all of the emplaced waste could be retrieved on a 
5 reasonable schedule starting at any time up to 50 years after waste Yes 
emplacement operations are initiated, unless a different time period is 
approved or specified by the commission. 
6 The waste package shall be designed to meet the full range of preclosure operating conditions for up to 300 years after the final waste emplacement. Yes 
The waste package and ancillary components shall withstand forces resulting from the normal 
conditions of a vertical lift and a horizontal lift (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Table 5.1.1-1). 
The waste package shall be designed to account for residual and differential thermal expansion 
stresses (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661 681, Section 6.2.2.2). 
The waste package shall be designed to account for internal pressure resulting from differential 
thermal expansion and increase in temperature. 
The waste package shall sustain its own self-weight while resting on the emplacement pallet 
(Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1 6 13621, Table 5.1.1-2). 
6.1.1.3 Shielding 
Shielding analyses evaluate the effects of ionizing radiation on personnel, equipment, and 
materials. The primary sources for waste package radiation are gamma rays and neutrons 
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emitted from spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Loading, handling, and 
transporting of waste packages would be carried out remotely to keep personnel exposure as low 
as is reasonably achievable (e.g., having the human operators behind radiation shield walls, using 
remote manipulators, viewing operations with video cameras). The general shielding 
requirements are stated in Section 4.9.1.3 of Minwalla (2003 [DIRS 1613621). Table 4.9.1-2 of 
Project Design Criteria Document (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621) does not list any shielding 
requirements on the waste package. The transporter and building provide shielding. 
6.1.1.4 Waste Form Accommodation 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.2.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Naval SNF Quantities and Characteristics 
Functional Requirement Text: The waste package shall accommodate naval SNF canisters (Table 
10). 
Table 10. Naval SNF Quantities and Characteristics Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
The naval short waste package shall accommodate a short (maximum 
1 4.750 m [187.00 inches]) naval SNF canister with a maximum diameter of Yes 
1.689 m (66.5 inches) and made of stainless steel type 316L (UNS S31603). 
The naval long waste package shall accommodate a long (maximum 5.385 m 
2 [212.00 inches]) naval SNF canister, with a maximum diameter of 1.689 m Yes 
(66.5 inches) and made of stainless steel type 31 6L (UNS S31603). 
3 The waste package shall accommodate a naval SNF canister with a maximum Yes 
weight of 49 tons. 
The waste package shall accommodate a naval SNF canister with an axial 
4 and radial center-of-gravity range to be established by the Naval Nuclear Yes 
Propulsion Program. 
6.1.1.5 Criticality 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.1.3 
Functional Requirement Title: Criticality Control 
Functional Requirement Text: The sealed waste package shall provide criticality control (Table 
11). 
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Table 1 1. Criticality Control Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
No. The The methodology defined in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program addendum Naval Nuclear (Mowbray 1999 [Dl RS 1495851) Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
1 Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051) shall be used to demonstrate Propulsion Program will 
acceptable postclosure criticality control for canisters and the waste packages 
address this in which they are disposed. 
requirement. 
No. The 
The methodology defined in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program letter Naval Nuclear 
2 (Griffith 2003 [DIRS 1651 751) shall be used to demonstrate acceptable Propulsion preclosure criticality control for canisters and the waste packages in which Program will 
they are disposed. address this 
requirement. 
No. The 
Naval Nuclear 
3 The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will verify meeting the criticality Propulsion criteria. Program will 
address this 
requirement. 
Due to the confidential nature of naval reactor fuel, no criticality calculations will be performed 
by the Waste Package and Components group. The U.S. Navy has provided an addendum to the 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]), which 
outlines the criticality methodology used by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Any 
assumptions concerning criticality are beyond the scope of this document. 
6.1.2 Event Sequence Evaluation 
6.1.2.1 Thermal 
The only event sequence affecting thermal performance is the fire accident (see Table 5.1.1 - 1 of 
Minwalla (2003 [DIRS 1613621). Thermal performance requirements during a fire are addressed 
by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. 
6.1.2.2 Structural 
The waste package shall not breach during normal operation or during credible preclosure event 
sequences (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654271, Section 3.1.1). The events considered include: 
Rock Fall on Waste Package-The waste package is at rest on the emplacement pallet in 
the drift without a drip shield, when rock(s) fall and impact the waste package surface 
(Mecharn 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 6.2.2.4). 
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Object Drop on Waste Package-The waste package is at rest in a vertical position and a 
equipment failure (i.e., gantry crane) falls and impacts the top of the waste package 
(Mecharn 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 6.2.2.4). 
Missile Impact on Waste Package-The waste package is at rest and a small object at 
high velocity impacts the waste package surface (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 
6.2.2.4). 
Waste Package Vertical Drop-The waste package is being lifted in a vertical 
orientation at a height of 2.0 m when the lifting device inadvertently drops it. The waste 
package impacts the ground squarely on its base (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 
6.2.2.5). 
Waste Package Tip-Over-The waste package is at rest on the ground in a vertical 
position and an external force (such as a seismic event) causes the waste package to tip 
over and impact the ground. A tip-over from an elevated surface is also considered 
(Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661 681, Section 6.2.2.5). 
Waste Package Horizontal Drop-The waste package is being lifted in a horizontal 
orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting device inadvertently drops it. The waste 
package impacts the ground squarely on its side (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 
6.2.2.5). 
Horizontal Drop with Emplacement Pallet-The emplacement pallet with waste 
package is being lifted in a horizontal orientation when the lifting device inadvertently 
drops it. The emplacement pallet with waste package impacts the ground along its 
horizontal axis. This is also done as a horizontal drop onto the emplacement pallet. The 
emplacement pallet is the object considered that may puncture the waste package 
(Mecharn 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 6.2.2.5). 
Waste Package Corner Drop-The waste package is being lifted in a vertical orientation 
at a height of 2.0 m when the lifting device inadvertently drops it. A comer of the waste 
package impacts the ground first (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 6.2.2.5). 
Waste Package 10-Degree Oblique Drop with Slap Down-The waste package is being 
lifted in a horizontal orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting device inadvertently 
releases one end. After the bottom end has rotated 10 degrees, the lifting device holding 
the top of the waste package fails and the entire waste package falls due to gravity and 
impacts the ground. 
Waste Package Swing Down-The waste package is being lifted in a horizontal 
orientation at a height of 2.4 m when the lifting device inadvertently releases one end. 
One end of the waste package remains held by the lifting device while the other end 
swings down and impacts the ground (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 6.2.2.5). 
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Waste Package Exposed to Vibratory Ground Motion-The waste package is subjected 
to vibratory ground motion in the underground for a seismic evaluation for an annual 
frequency of exceedance of 5 x 1 0 ~  per year (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 
6.2.2.6). 
The drop analyses described previously are performed with the trunnion collars attached to the 
fully loaded waste package, since that is the normal condition for moving the waste package. 
The trunnion collar adds a small amount of mass and loading, so in general, the drops analyzed 
with the attached trunnion collar are conservative 
6.2 POSTCLOSURE 
6.2.1 Structural 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.1.2 
Functional Requirement Title: Postclosure Confinement 
Functional Requirement Text: The sealed waste package shall restrict the transport of 
radionuclides to the outside of the waste package boundary after repository closure (Table 12). 
Table 12. Postclosure Confinement Performance Requirements 
Performance 
Requirement Performance Requirement Text Applicability 
Number 
In conjunction with natural barriers and other engineered barriers, the sealed 
1 waste package shall limit transport of radionuclides in a manner sufficient to Yes 
meet long-term repository performance requirements. 
2 The waste package shall be designed and constructed to the codes and 
standards specified in the (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Section 5.1 .I). Yes 
3 Normal operations and event load combinations are defined in the (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 1613621, Table 5.1 .I-2). Yes 
The waste package shall not breach during a postclosure seismic event (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 
161 3621, Table 5.1.1-2). This postclosure seismic event is addressed in Commercial SNF Waste 
Package Design Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1668761, Appendix A). 
6.2.2 Thermal 
Thermal requirements are the same for preclosure as for postclosure. See Section 6.1.1.1 for 
thermal requirements. 
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7. SATISFACTION OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
7.1 PRECLOSURE 
The waste package must satisfy defined performance specifications to protect the public and 
workers and to meet the performance objectives of a repository. An example of a performance 
specification is the ability of a waste package to withstand a tip-over event without breaching. 
Performance specifications are discussed in the following sections, where they are categorized 
by relevant engineering discipline (i.e., thermal, criticality, structural, and shielding). Detailed 
discussions of performance specifications are available in system description documents (e.g., 
BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654271). 
Some of the performance specifications and supporting evaluations depend on temperature. In 
these cases, the evaluation is based on the higher-temperature operating mode. Further 
evaluations of lower-temperature operating modes are part of ongoing engineering studies. 
7.1.1 Normal Operations 
7.1.1.1 Thermal 
The thermal calculations for normal operations are performed continuously through preclosure 
and postclosure times. Two-dimensional, thermal calculations for a naval long waste package 
are reported in Thermal Evaluation of the Naval Long Waste Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
1670801). 
The temperature boundary conditions applied to the waste package outer surface for the two- 
dimensional calculations are taken from a three-dimensional (pillar) calculation of a 
representative drift segment (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1647261, Section 6). 
The thermal condition for the naval waste package inside of the trolley in the surface facility 
weld cell has not been evaluated; however, this condition was addressed for the 21-PWR waste 
package, which is a more bounding case (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1640751, Section 6). Most of the 
cases in this calculation were for a waste package in a shielded transporter, except for one case, 
which determined results without a transporter. These calculations show that without shielding, 
waste form temperatures near the center of the waste package remain below 350°C at all times, 
even if steady-state thermal conditions are achieved. If shielding is used, temperatures remain 
below 350°C for several days, but will eventually exceed this temperature. For this reason the 
duration the waste packages with high heat loads can remain in a shielded transporter must be 
limited. 
7.1.1.1.1 Thermal Results 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 from Thermal Evaluation of the Naval Long Waste Package (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 1670801, Figures 5 and 8, respectively) are shown below. The maximum canister surface 
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with the operating curves from Two-Dimensional Repository Thermal Design Calculations (BSC 
2003 [DIRS 1650931) to estimate thermal margins resulting from design variations. 
7.1.1.2 Structural 
7.1.1.2.1 Lifting 
The waste package must be able to be lifted using the twist-on trunnion collars for normal 
operations. The waste package will be lifted by the top trunnion collar when in the vertical 
orientation and by both the top and bottom trunnion collars when in the horizontal orientation. 
Since the top trunnion collar lifts the entire waste package in the vertical orientation and the 
Naval SNF Long waste package has the greatest mass, this scenario was analyzed. The resulting 
maximum stress intensities for various waste package components at room temperature and 
300°C are presented in Tables 13 and 14 from Vertical Lift of the Naval SNF Long Waste 
Package (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1668271, Table 6-3 and 6-4, respectively). 
Table 13. Maximum Stress lntensities at Room Temperature 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1668271, Table 6-3 
Table 14. Maximum Stress lntensities at 300°C 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1668271, Table 6-4 
Tables 13 and 14 show that the maximum stresses in the components of the waste package are 
less than 113 the yield strength and 115 the tensile strength (ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 102016], 
Section 4.2.1.1). However, the trunnion sleeve and the lifting collar have maximum stress 
intensities above those limits. BSC (2003 [DIRS 1668271, Section 6) shows the maximum stress 
in the trunnion sleeve is a localized contact stress between the trunnion sleeve and the trunnion 
collar. Furthermore, BSC (2003 [DIRS 1668271, Section 6) shows that the stresses are far below 
the requirements in the surrounding areas and through the thickness of the engagement. In 
addition the lifting collars and trunnion sleeve have filleted corners and chamfered corners that 
would alleviate stresses in the comers and edges. 
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[DIRS 1526551): 21-PWR, 44-BWR, 24-BWR, 12-PWR Long, 5 DHLWIDOE SNF Short, 
2-MC012-DHLW, and Naval SNF Long. For each one of these potential waste package design 
configurations, a parametric study is performed by calculating the interference produced by the 
thermal expansion of the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. The interference between the 
two components causes a pressure at the interface of the two components. This pressure is used 
to calculate the outer corrosion barrier tangential stresses at the inner and outer surfaces. The 
temperature range for this calculation is 20°C to 239OC. 
The outer corrosion barrier maximum tangential stresses at the outer and inner surfaces for a 
corresponding gap size are shown in Tables 15 and 16. 
Table 15. Outer Corrosion Barrier Maximum Tangential Stress at the Outer Surface 
Source: BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551, Table 4 
Table 16. Outer Corrosion Barrier Maximum Tangential Stress at the Inner Surface 
Source: BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551, Table 5 
As a result of this calculation the minimum radial gap is determined to be 1.0 rnrn. The naval 
configuration drawings, referenced in Section 5.2, incorporate this minimum radial gap. 
7.1.1.2.3 Axial Thermal Expansion 
~ o i r  different potential waste package design configurations are evaluated in Waste Package 
Axial Thermal Expansion Calculation (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1616911): the 21-PWR, Naval SNF 
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Long, 44-BWR, and 5 DHLWDOE SNF Long. For each one of these potential waste package 
design configurations, a parametric study is performed to calculate the interference produced by 
the thermal expansion of the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier to determine the required 
axial gap. Because the inner vessel undergoes a greater change in temperature and has a larger 
coefficient of thermal expansion as compared to those of the outer corrosion barrier, this 
interference is calculated as the inner vessel length minus the outer corrosion barrier cavity 
length subsequent to thermal expansion. The length of this interference is equal to the required 
axial gap created during fabrication (i.e., at room temperature and prior to fuel loading) to avoid 
contact between the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier during thermal expansion. These 
minimum axial gaps are presented in Table 17. 
Table 17. Minimum Required Axial Gap Between the Inner Vessel and Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1616911, Table 4 
Waste Package Type 
21-PWR 
Naval SNF - Long 
44-BWR 
5 DHLWIDOE SNF- Long 
As a result of this calculation and for added conservatism the minimum axial gap is determined 
to be 10.0 mm. The naval configuration drawings, referenced in Section 5.2, incorporate this 
minimum axial gap. 
7.1.1.2.4 Internal Pressurization Due to Thermal Expansion 
Maximum 
Interference 
(mm) (in.) 
This calculation determines the resulting tangential (hoop) and longitudinal stresses in the outer 
corrosion barrier produced by an internal pressure increase due to elevated temperatures and a 
decreasing volume fiom thermal expansion. From Waste Package Outer Barrier Stress Due to 
Thermal Expansion with Various Barrier Gap Sizes (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551, Tables 4 and 5, 
p. 13) the required radial gap between the waste package inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier 
to avoid contact is 1 mm. This calculation assumes that the waste package inner vessel and outer 
corrosion barrier have a 1-mm gap between them, and this gap collapses completely due to 
uneven thermal expansion; consequently, the gas volume between the inner vessel and outer 
corrosion barrier decreases, increasing the internal pressure. Temperature is also taken into 
consideration for calculating the internal pressure, and for added conservatism the only mode of 
heat transfer is solely through radiation to determine the temperature difference between the 
inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier. 
8.1 
7.6 
8.0 
6.8 
Table 18 below provides the resulting gage pressure with respect to ambient pressure for each 
waste package. The results are summarized in Table 19 and the non-dimensional results in Table 
20, comparing the tangential (hoop) and longitudinal stress to the yield stress (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
0.32 
0.30 
0.32 
0.27 
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Table 18. Resulting Gage Pressure with Respect to Ambient Pressure 
Gage Pressure with Respect to Ambient, Pgage Waste Package (atm) (KPa) (psi) 
21-PWR 2.65 268 38.9 
Naval SNF - Long 2.24 227 32.9 
44-BWR 2.59 263 38.1 
5 DHLWIDOE SNF - Long 2.09 21 2 30.7 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1670051, Table 2 
Table 19. Calculation Results 
Tangential Stress, 0, Longitudinal Stress, 0, Waste Package (MPa) (ksi) (MPa) (ksi) 
21-PWR 10.2 1.48 5.12 0.742 
Naval SNF - Long 10.3 1.50 5.1 7 0.750 
44-BWR 10.2 1.48 5.12 0.742 
5 DHLWIDOE SNF - Long 10.5 1.52 5.26 0.762 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1670051, Table 3 
Table 20. Non-dimensional Results 
I Waste Packaae 1 Y 1 Y I 
- (%) (%) 
2)-PWR 4.51 2.26 
Naval SNF - Long 4.55 2.28 
44-BWR 4.51 2.25 
5 DHLWIDOE SNF - Long 4.63 2.32 
- 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1670051, Table 4 
Based on the results of Table 20, the outer corrosion barrier is subjected to a stress that is less 
than 5 percent of its yield strength in the hoop direction and less than 3 percent in the axial 
direction. 
7.1.1.2.5 Static Waste Package on Pallet 
Static Waste Packages on Emplacement Pallet (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1654921) reports static stresses 
for each of the four flagship waste packages resting on the emplacement pallet with three 
different variations in radial gap between the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier, producing 
parametric results. This was done to create a solution that can be used for later modifications to 
the design. The radial gap sizes evaluated were 4 mm, 10 mm, and 15 mm. The outer corrosion 
barrier thickness was reduced to conservatively show 10,000 years of corrosion degradation. 
Table 21 shows that the Naval Long waste package is capable of supporting its own weight when 
on the emplacement pallet. 
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Table 21. Maximum Stresses Intensities in Outer Corrosion Barrier 
I Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654921, Table 6-2 
The stresses reported are less than the yield stress of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). The results 
indicate significant margin to failure for a range of gap sizes. The yield stress of Alloy 22 (UNS 
N06022) may be found in Section 5.3.2, Table 2 of this document. Therefore, the waste package 
is able to withstand the stresses of its own weight even after 10,000 years of degradation. Since 
this is a bounding case, the results show that the non-degraded waste package is also capable of 
withstanding the stresses of its own weight. 
15 mm Radial Gap 
(MPa) 
90 
116 
76 
52 
I 7.1.1.3 Shielding 
10 mm Radial Gap 
(MPa) 
80 
80 
84 
42 
Waste Package 
21 -PWR 
44-BW R 
Naval SNF - Long 
5 DHLWIDOE SNF-Short 
The following dose rate calculations are from Dose Rate Calculation for the Naval Long Waste 
Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821). 
4 mm Radial Gap 
(MPa) 
90 
86 
74 
20 
I 7.1.1.3.1 Description of Shielding Calculations I 7.1.1.3.1.1 Source Sampling 
Calculations are performed to determine the dose rates at selected surfaces on and near the waste 
package exterior at 2 and 5 years after reactor shutdown as a result of photon and neutron 
currents exiting the naval long SNF canister filled with naval SNF. The currents exiting the 
naval canister surfaces are the radiation sources emitting from the canister. Since the neutron 
sources from the top, bottom, and side surfaces do not vary significantly, only one calculation is 
necessary for the neutron surface dose rates. However, for the photon dose rates, three separate 
calculations are required for the top, bottom, and side surfaces. The side source of 
4.7069.10'~ photodsec is several orders of magnitude larger than the top and bottom sources of 
3.5 102 . lo7 and 7.5892 -10" photodsec, respectively. These large differences in the relative 
magnitude of the source intensities result in under sampling of the top and bottom source 
regions, therefore making a single calculation insufficient. 
Furthermore, the naval canister top surface includes three different sources corresponding to the 
six bolt holes, the region outside the bolt holes and inside an 18-in. radius, and the region above 
the seal weld as illustrated in Figure 5. When multiple source regions are present, corresponding 
source distribution numbers are used, to specify their locations. Spatially, a degenerate 
cylindrical volume distribution is used to specify particle sampling from the top, bottom, and 
radial surfaces of the naval canister. The outer dimensions of the degenerate cylinder are 
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The photon calculations, for a given time of reference (i.e., 2 and 5 years), were conducted in 
three separate simulations: top, bottom, and side. The neutron dose calculation was performed in 
a single calculation. Furthermore, the effects of photon backscattering was quantified by 
examining the difference in the exterior dose rates with and without the 30 cm thick concrete 
cylindrical cell present. 
7.1.1.3.2 Waste Package Surface Dose Rates 
Table 22 through Table 33 from BSC (2004 [DIRS 1670821) present the gamma, neutron, and 
total dose rates averaged over the surface segments of the naval long waste package and at 1 and 
2 meters away from the waste package external radial surfaces. Table 22 shows that the waste 
package surface dose rates due to secondary gamma rays are negligible as compared to the 
gamma dose rates. Consequently, this dose component was not listed in the following tables. 
Table 22. Dose Rates on the Waste Package lnner Vessel lnner Surface T = 2 Years 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-1 
Table 23. Dose Rates on the Waste Package lnner Vessel Outer Surface T = 2 Years 
Primary Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment 1 1985.6 0.0019 0.231 0.002 1985.8 0.0019 
Segment 2 2106.2 0.0018 0.252 0.002 2106.4 0.0018 
Segment 3 2108.5 0.0018 0.251 0.002 2108.7 0.0018 
Segment 4 21 01.9 0.0018 0.252 0.002 2102.1 0.0018 
Segment 5 2108.1 0.0018 0.251 0.002 2108.4 0.0018 
Segment6 . 2072.7 . 0.0018 . 0.239 0.002 2073.0 0.0018 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-2 
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Table 24. Dose Rates on the Waste Package Outer Corrosion Barrier Outer Surface T = 2 Years 
Primary Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment 1 368.0 0.0025 0.095 0.002 368.1 0.0025 
Segment 2 391.4 0.0024 0.104 0.001 391.5 0.0024 
Segment 3 392.1 0.0024 0.104 0.001 392.2 0.0024 
Segment 4 390.7 0.0024 0.104 0.001 390.8 0.0024 
Segment 5 391.8 0.0024 0.104 0.001 391.9 0.0024 
Se ment 6 383.3 
, g 0.0025 0.099 0.002 383.4 0.0025 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-3 
Table 25. Dose Rates I m from the Waste Package Outer Corrosion Barrier Outer Surface T = 2 Years 
Primary Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location rem,hr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment 1 124.4 0.0022 0.033 0.002 124.5 0.0022 
Segment 2 160.3 0.0019 0.041 0.001 160.4 0.0019 
Segment 3 166.9 0.0019 0.044 0.001 166.9 0.0019 
Segment 4 166.8 0.0019 0.044 0.001 166.8 0.0019 
Segment 5 161.8 0.0019 0.041 0.001 161.8 0.0019 
Segment 6 128.0 0.0022 0.034 0.002 128.0 0.0022 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-4 
Table 26. Dose Rates 2m from the Waste Package Outer Corrosion Barrier Outer Surface T = 2 Years 
Primary Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment 1 76.3 0.0021 0.023 0.002 76.4 0.0021 
Segment 2 99.5 0.0018 0.028 0.001 99.5 0.001 8 
Segment 3 108.3 0.0018 0.031 0.001 108.3 0.0018 
Segment 4 108.7 0.0018 0.031 0.001 108.7 0.0018 
Segment 5 100.4 0.0018 0.029 0.001 100.4 0.0018 
, Segment 6 . 77.9 0.0021 . 0.024 . 0.002 . 78.0 . 0.0021 . 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-5 
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Table 27. Dose Rates on the Waste Package Surface T = 2 Years 
Gamma Neutron Total 1 
Exterior Surface 
Exterior Surface 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-6 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 43 of 98 
Table 28. Dose Rate on the Waste Package lnner Vessel lnner Surface T = 5 Years 
Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment 1 45607.5 0.001 1 0.662 0.002 45608.2 0.001 1 
Segment 2 48324.7 0.001 1 0.71 1 0.001 48325.4 0.001 1 
Segment 3 48210.8 0.001 1 0.710 0.001 4821 1.5 0.001 1 
Segment 4 48214.9 0.001 1 0.71 1 0.001 4821 5.6 0.001 1 
Segment 5 48286.5 0.001 1 0.707 0.001 48287.2 0.001 1 
Segment 6 , 48252.1 , 0.001 1 , 0.694 , 0.002 . 48252.8 . 0.001 1 , 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1 -7 
Table 29. Dose Rate on the Waste Package lnner Vessel Outer Surface T = 5 Years 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-8 
Table 30. Dose Rate on the Waste Package Outer Corrosion Barrier Outer Surface T = 5 Years 
Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment 1 167.8 0.0025 0.095 0.002 167.9 0.0025 
Segment 2 179.0 0.0024 0.104 0.001 179.1 0.0024 
Segment 3 179.3 0.0024 0.104 0.001 179.4 0.0024 
Segment 4 178.5 0.0024 0.104 0.001 178.6 0.0024 
Segment 5 178.8 0.0024 0.104 0.001 178.9 0.0024 
Segment 6 174.6 0.0024 0.099 0.002 174.7 0.0024 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-9 
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Table 31. Dose Rate 1 m from Waste Package Outer Corrosion Barrier Outer Surface T = 5 years 
Gamma Neutron Total 
Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Axial Location remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
- 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-10 
Table 32. Dose Rates 2 m from the Waste Package Outer Corrosion Barrier Outer Surface T = 5 years 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-1 1 
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Table 33. Dose Rates on the Waste Package Surface T = 5 years 
Primary Gamma Neutron Total 
Axial Location Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Dose Rate Relative Segment remlhr Error remlhr Error remlhr Error 
Segment7 1.820E+01 0.0170 7.384E-02 0.0035 1.820E+OI 0.0170 Bottom Surface 
Outer Corrosion Segment 8 4.077E+00 0.01 73 3.070E-02 0.0036 4.109E+00 0.01 72 
Barrier 
Bottom Surface Segment9 3.294E+01 0.0041 2.623E-02 0.0021 3.294E+01 0.0041 
1 m from Outer Segment 8 4.729E+00 0.0095 1.554E-02 0.0041 4.745E+00 0.0095 
Corrosion 
Barrier Bottom Segment 9 6.556E+00 0.0046 1.382E-02 0.0025 6.561 E+OO 0.0046 
2 m from Outer Segment 8 4.178E+00 0.0091 1.120E-02 0.0046 4.191 E+00 0.0091 
Corrosion 
Barrier Bottom Segment 10 5.177E+00 0.0031 1.090E-02 0.0018 5.181 E+00 0.0031 
Hole # 1 4.515E-03 0.0101 2.763E-02 0.0946 1.562E-02 0.0813 
Hole # 2 4.467E-03 0.0102 2.772E-02 0.1 110 1.567E-02 0.0956 
Top of Waste Hole # 3 4.484E-03 0.0102 3.278E-02 0.1002 1.578E-02 0.0882 
Package Hole # 4 4.508E-03 0.0102 3.084E-02 0.0987 1.571 E-02 0.0861 Hole # 5 4.473E-03 0.0102 3.239E-02 0.0995 1.567E-02 0.0874 
Inner Vessel Top 
Exterior Surface 
Exterior Surface 
Exterior Surface 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Table 6.1-12 
Table 34 and Table 35 from BSC (2004 [DIRS 1670821) highlight the magnitude of thehcrease 
in the dose on the top and radial exterior waste package surfaces resulting from photon 
backscatter, from the concrete structure at T = 2 years. The waste package surface dose rates due 
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to secondary gamma rays are negligible as compared to the gamma dose rates; consequently, this 
dose component was not listed in the following tables. 
I Table 34. Photon Backscatter Effects on the Outer Lid Exterior Surface (Top) 
Total Gamma Dose (Scatter) 
Table 35. Photon Backscatter Effects on the Outer Corrosion Barrier Exterior Surface (Sides) 
Total Gamma Dose (No 
Scatter) 
Segment 9 
Total Gamma Dose (Scatter) / Total Gamma Dose (No I Scatter) 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Tables 6.2-1 
Dose Rate 
remlhr 
57.7 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Tables 6.2-2 
Relative 
Error 
0.0041 
Table 36 shows the photon backscattering effects on the waste package bottom exterior surface. 
Table 36. Photon Backscatter Effects on the WP Bottom Exterior Surface 
Dose Rate 
remlhr 
47.9 
- - - - - - - 
Relative 
Error Axial Location 
Relative 
Error 
0.0044 
Dose Rate 
remlhr 
Dose Rate 
remlhr 
Relative I Dm;te  I Relative I I ~ x i a l  ~ocation I DO.",P I Error Error 
Relative 
Error 
Total Gamma Dose (Scatter) Total Gamma Dose (No Scatter) 
- --
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670821, Tables 6.2-3 
Outer Corrosion 
Barrier OD 
Segment 8 
7.1.1.3.3 Dose Rate Conclusions 
In this section BSC (2004 [DIRS 1670821, Section 6.2) draws the following conclusions 
regarding the naval waste package. 
.522 
7.870 
The primary gamma and neutron components of the total dose rates Eave been calculated for a 
number of surfaces on the interior and exterior of the waste package, as well as at 1 and 2 meters . 
away from the waste package exterior. The tabulated dose rate results are suitable to support the 
waste package and repository facility designs. 
0.0008 
0.01 94 
1.517 
4.961 
0.0007 
0.0255 
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The maximum external dose rate is 392.2 re&, at 2 years after reactor shutdown. This occurs 
at segment 3 of the outer corrosion barrier exterior radial surface as presented in Table 24. The 
exterior radial surface dose rate varies from 392.2 to 368.1 remlhr across the height of the naval 
waste package interior cavity (see Table 24). The dose rates on the waste package bottom and 
top contact surfaces are 9.423 re& (see Table 27) and 3.186 remlhr, respectively (see Table 
27). 
The maximum external dose rate is 179.4 remlhr, at 5 years after reactor shutdown. This occurs 
at segment 3 of the outer corrosion barrier exterior radial surface as presented in Table 30. The 
exterior radial surface dose rate varies from 179.4 to 167.9 rernlhr across the height of the naval 
long waste package interior cavity (see Table 30). The dose rates on the waste package bottom 
and top contact surfaces are 4.109 re& and 1.465 remlhr, respectively (see Table 33). 
The presence of concrete augments the top, bottom, and the radial exterior surface dose rates due 
to photon backscattering from the surrounding concrete walls. 
The top and bottom waste package exterior surface dose rates are influenced the greatest by 
photon backscatter, as seen in Table 34 and Table 36, mainly as a result of back-scattering from 
the side-walls around the waste package. 
As a result of photon back-scatter, the radial exterior surface dose rates increase from 384.8 - 
360.8 remlhr across the height of the naval long waste package interior cavity (see Table 35) to 
392.2 - 368.1 r edh r  (see Table 35). 
The secondary gamma component is negligible with respect to the primary photon component of 
the total dose rates. 
I 7.1.1.4 Waste Form Accommodation 
There are two naval SNF canisters that must be accommodated by waste package design 
configurations. The naval canisters have the same 1.689-m (66.5-in) diameter with different 
lengths. The short canister is 4.750 m (187.0 in.) in length and the long canister 5.385 m (212.0 
in.) in length (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654271, Section 3.1.2, p. 15, Performance Requirements 1 and 
2). Two waste package configurations have been designed and developed. The naval SNF short 
waste package accommodates the naval short canister and the naval long SNF long waste 
package accommodates the long canister. The two packages, differing only in length, are 
identical in materials, diameter, lid, and weld details. 
I These dimensions may be verified on the following configuration drawings: 
Naval Long Waste Package Configuration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648541). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1581) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 159]), respectively. 
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Naval Short Waste Package ConJiguration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648551). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1601) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 161]), respectively. 
7.1.1.5 Criticality 
Due to the classified nature of naval reactor fuel, no criticality calculations will be performed by 
the Waste Package and Components group. The addendum to Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051) outlines the criticality methodology 
used by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Any assumptions concerning criticality are 
beyond the scope of this document 
7.1.2 Preclosure Event Sequences 
7.1.2.1 Thermal 
Thermal performance of a naval package during a fire is addressed by the Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion Program independently from Waste Package and Components. 
7.1.2.2 Structural 
The waste package is a component identified as important to safety (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1651791, 
Table A-2, p. A-4) since it provides containment for the waste forms. The waste package is 
credited to prevent a release, in terms of dose to workers and the public during the preclosure 
period. Therefore, the waste package is designed to a set of criteria to ensure that the waste 
package will not breach as a result of credible event sequences. 
The waste package design is evaluated using a finite element analysis based on numerical 
simulations of waste package dynamic events including, but not limited to, vertical and 
horizontal drops, slapdowns, drops onto objects, collisions, and equipment drops onto the waste 
package. 
The failure criterion used is explained in detail in Section 7.1.2.3.1.2 and is broken into tiered 
screening criteria shown below. The easiest to apply and most conservative criteria are applied 
initially. If these can not be met, less conservative screening criteria are imposed that require 
more calculations. These screening criteria in decreasing order of conservatism are listed below 
(an element's total stress intensity, oint is equal to twice the element's maximum shear stress 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151, Section 111, Division 1, NB-3000)): 
Maximum oint < 0.7aU? Yes: Meets P, and PL limits without the need for 
wall averaging. 
No: ' 
Maximum oint < 0.770,? Yes: Meets PL limit without the need for wall 
averaging but the stress field must not be uniform 
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around the entire circumference (only a concern for 
vertical drop events). 
No: 
Maximum wall-averaged oint < 0.7 a, ? Yes: Meets P, and PL limits. 
No: 
Maximum wall-averaged oint < 0.770, ? Yes: Meets PL limit if the stress fields are not 
uniform around the entire circumference (only a 
concern for vertical drop events). 
No: 
Maximum wall-averaged oint < 0.84 a, 
and 
wall-averaged Gin, <0.77 0. at 
surrounding maximum location? Yes: Meets PL and average primary shear limit 
No: 
Maximum wall-averaged oint < 0.9 a, 
wall-averaged oint <0.77 o, at JR . t 
surrounding maximum location? 
and 
wall-average of each shear stress on the 
stress classification line 
(T,~, T~~ and T,,) <0.42au ? 
(x,y,z are element (not global) directions 
orthogonal to the stress classification line) Yes: Meets PL and average primary shear limit 
No: Fails simplified screening criterion. 
Note: P, is the general primary membrane stress 
PL is the local primary membrane 
Pb is the primary bending 
R is the median wall radius 
t is the wall thickness. 
If the wall-averaged oint limits can not be met, perform a less conservative rigorous Code 
evaluation using all six stress components (and solve a cubic equation for principle stress 
direction values) 'and/or use multiple stress classification lines to extrapolate to goveniing wall 
locations when they have significant non-membrane primary stress intensity contributions. 
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If the average primary shear limit can not be met, then review appropriateness of using a stress 
classification plane rather than a stress classification line. 
7.1.2.2.1 Preclosure Rock Fall Evaluations 
Rock falls may occur both in the preclosure and postclosure periods. For the preclosure period, 
the drip shields have not yet been emplaced, so rocks may fall onto the emplaced waste 
packages. Rock Fall on waste Packages (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1671821) investigates four waste 
package configurations for license application (2 1-PWR waste package, 44-BWR waste package, 
5-DHLWIDOE SNF codisposal short waste package, and Naval Canistered SNF long waste 
package) to determine their structural response to rock fall dynamic loads (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 
16 13621, Table 5.1.1 - 1. Furthermore, four different axial locations of impact are evaluated. The 
first impact location is selected at the waste package bottom-end, directly above the trunnion-to- 
bottom lid fillet-weld region; second, at mid-length; third, directly above the emplacement pallet 
support; and fourth, at the waste package upper-end, directly above the closure-weld region. 
These locations are critical to the waste package. 
One waste package configuration is used to determine the most damaging location of impact 
among the four impact locations. The results of these calculations suggest that the most 
damaging results are obtained when the axial location of the initial impact zone is directly above 
the trunnion collar sleeve, at the bottom lid fillet-weld region. Consequently, the rock fall 
calculations for all waste package configurations are performed for this impact location. 
Single rock fall evaluations have been performed for the waste package, resting on the 
emplacement pallet, with one bounding rock size (6.8 MT [15,000 lbs.]) and initial impact 
velocity (6 d s  [20 Ws]). An additional scenario is performed to determine the effect of the 
greatest initial impact velocity (1.3 MT [2900 lbs.], 14 d s  [46 Ws]). The results show that the 
rock with the greatest mass causes higher stresses than the rock with the greatest initial impact 
velocity. 
BSC (2004 [DIRS 1671821) also determines the response of waste package components to 
multiple rock falls onto the same location. The main purpose of this study is to determine the 
effect of two rocks on the stress intensity history when they impact the same location on the 
waste package. For this purpose, a 21-PWR waste package configuration is selected. This waste 
package configuration is subjected to the highest stress intensity for the bounding impact 
location; therefore, the results of this case are bounding for all waste package configurations. 
Similar to the single rock fall evaluations, the bottom end of the waste package is impacted by 
two identical rocks (3.0 MT [6600 Ibs.], 5.9 m/s [19 Ws]). 
For the simulation of the rock fall onto a corroded waste package, the thickness of the Alloy 22 
(UNS, N06022) components is appropriately reduced, based on the calculation of the depth of 
, 
corroded the layer presented in BSC (2004 [DIRS 1671 821, Section 5.3). 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
~ o c u k e n t  Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 5 1 of 98 
The results of the rock fall evaluations indicate that for all rock impact simulations, the 
maximum stress intensity in the outer corrosion barrier and outer lids is less than 70% of the 
ultimate tensile strength of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) at maximum temperatures during their 
presence in the repository (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1671821, Section 6). Therefore, no breach of the 
waste package is expected fiom preclosure rock fall. 
7.1.2.2.2 Object Drop on Naval Long Waste Package 
The object drop (see Section 6.1.2.2 of this document) consists of raising a hook that is used to 
lift the waste package directly above a vertically standing waste package. The hook is raised to a 
maximum height of 9.1 m (30 ft). The lifting device with the hook attached, fails, and the hook 
falls due to gravity. The hook then impacts the waste package top surface. Object Drop on 
Naval Long Waste Package (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1658951) performs this calculation at room I 
1 temperature and 300°C to bound potential waste package operational temperatures. 
Figure 7 outlines the shape of the impact region at the end of the simulation for a 1,361-kg 
(3,000-lb.) hook drop from 9.1 m (30 ft) at two different temperatures. Note that the middle lid 
remains to be directly supported by the outer corrosion barrier. Consequently, there is no contact 
between the middle lid and the inner vessel. 
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Table 37. Missile Impact Parameters for Three Different Case Studies 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Missile diameter 10 mm 20 mm 30 mm 
Missile mass 0.5 kg 1.0 kg 1.5 kg 
Missile velocity 5.7 mls 6.0 mls 6.3 mls 
Source: CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1493511, Table 5.2-1, p. 4 
The structural response of the waste package to dynamic impact of a pressurized system missile 
is reported in terms of the minimum velocities required for a pressurized system missile to cause 
perforation of the waste package barriers. The calculation results are summarized in Table 38. 
Table 38. Pressurized System Missile Impact Results for Different Waste Packages 
Minimum Required Velocity of Projectile to 
Waste Package Cause Perforation (mls) 
Case1 Case 2 Case 3 
21-PWR 322 383 424 
44-BWR 322 383 424 
5-DHLWIDOE SNF Short 339 403 446 
Naval SNF Long 339 403 446 
Source: CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 1493511, Table 6-1, p. 7 
7.1.2.2.4 Vertical Drop of Naval Long Waste Package 
The vertical drop consists of raising the waste package vertically to a maximum height of 2.0 m 
(Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 5.2.8, p. 54). The lifting device carrying the waste 
package fails and the waste package falls due to gravity. The waste package then impacts an 
unyielding surface. Vertical Drop of Naval SNF Long Waste Package (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
1616901) performs thi$ calculation at room temperature and 100°C to bound potential waste 
package operational temperatures. The results for the vertical drop of the naval long waste 
package are shown in Table 39. 
Table 39 lists the maximum stress intensities, oint, in the inner vessel and outer corrosion barriers 
of the Naval SNF Long waste package at room temperature and 100°C. 
Table 39. Maximum Stress Intensities in the lnner Vessel and Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Max Stress 
Part Temperature Intensity, ~ l n t  Dint 1 n u  
(MPa) 
Inner Vessel RT 461 0.66 
Outer Corrosion Barrier RT 1084 1 . I2  
Inner Vessel 100°C 456 0.69 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 100°C 1002 1.02 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1616901, Table 8, p. 24 
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The preceding table shows that the inner vessel's maximum stress intensities were less than 70 
percent of the tensile strengths at both temperatures, indicating that the inner vessel remained 
intact during this drop scenario. For added containment the naval SNF canister provides an 
additional level of protection. Therefore, it can be concluded that the waste package containment 
capabilities remain effective. 
7.1.2.2.5 Naval Long Tip-over from Elevated Surface 
The tip-over from an elevated surface consists of the waste package toppling from a 0.5-m 
(1.6-ft) pedestal (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 5.2.8, p. 54). The waste package tips 
about its bottom edge to the point at which the center of gravity is directly above the rotation 
point. The waste package then continues to tip over due to gravity. The waste package then 
impacts an unyielding surface with the top edge. Naval SNF Long Waste Package Tip-Over 
from an Elevated Surface (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670791) performs this calculation at room 
temperature and 300°C to bound potential waste package operational temperatures. The results 
for the tip-over from an elevated surface of the naval long waste package are shown in Table 40. 
I Table 40. Maximum Stress Intensity in the Outer Corrosion Barrier 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670791, Section 6 
Part 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 
According to Table 40, the maximum wall-averaged stress intensities in the outer corrosion 
barrier are below nine-tenths of the true tensile strength of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). For both 
temperatures the maximum wall-averaged stress intensities exceed 0.770, and a study is needed 
of the size of the region where the wall-averaged stress intensities exceed 0.770,. The distance 
over which wall-averaged stress intensities exceed 0.770, is 0.13 1, which is less than 
Temperature 
RT 
300°C 
(where R is the average radius of the outer corrosion barrier and t is the wall thickness). 
Therefore, for both temperature scenarios the outer corrosion barrier meets the criteria set forth 
in Section 7.1.2.2 of this document. Therefore no breach of the outer corrosion barrier is 
expected for a tip-over from a 0.5-m (1.6-ft) pedestal. For a tip-over from an elevated surface, 
there is greater potential energy associated with this scenario; consequently, this case is bounding 
for the event sequence involving a waste package tip-over while at rest on a flat surface. 
7.1.2.2.6 Naval Long Waste Package Horizontal Drop on Flat Surface 
Max Stress 
Intensity, alnt 
(MPa) 
852 
726 
The horizontal drop consists of raising the waste package horizontally to a maximum height of 
2.4 m (Mecharn 2004 [DIRS 1661681, section 5.2.8, p. 54). The lifting device carrying the waste 
package fails and the waste package falls due to gravity. The waste package then impacts an 
oht I ou 
0.88 
0.80 
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unyielding surface. Horizontal Drop of Naval SNF Long Waste Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
1670781) performs the calculation at room temperature and 300°C to bound potential waste 
package operational temperatures. The results for the horizontal drop of the naval long waste 
package are shown in Table 41. This table contains maximum wall-averaged stress intensities in 
the outer corrosion barrier at room temperature and 300°C and a comparison of these stresses to 
the true tensile strength of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). 
Table 41. Wall-averaged Stress Intensity in the Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Max Stress 
Part Temperature Intensity, flint Qint I QU 
(MPa) 
Outer Corrosion Barrier RT 802 0.83 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 300°C 700 0.77 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670781, Table 6-4 
From Table 41 the maximum wall-averaged stress intensities in the outer corrosion barrier are 
below nine-tenths of the true tensile strength of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). Furthermore, at 300°C 
maximum wall-averaged stress intensities do not exceed 0.770,. Therefore, at 300°C the outer 
corrosion barrier meets the plastic analysis criteria (see Section 7.1.2.2). However, at RT the 
maximum wall-averaged stress intensity exceeds 0.770, and a study is needed to determine the 
size of the region where the wall-averaged stress intensities exceed 0.770,. The distance over 
which wall-averaged stress intensities exceed 0.770, is 0.152 which is less than (where R 
is the average radius of the outer corrosion barrier and t is the wall thickness). Therefore, for the 
room temperature case, the outer corrosion barrier meets the criteria set forth in Section 7.1.2.2 
of this document. Consequently, no breach of the outer corrosion barrier is expected. 
7.1.2.2.7 Naval Long Waste Package Horizontal Drop with Emplacement Pallet 
The horizontal drop with emplacement pallet consists of raising the waste package horizontally 
while resting on the emplacement pallet to a maximum height of 0.782 m (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 
1661681, Section 5.2.8, p. 54). The lifting device carrying the waste package and emplacement 
pallet fails and the two fall due to gravity. The waste package then impacts an unyielding 
surface with the emplacement pallet first. This scenario is also performed as a waste package 
horizontal drop onto the emplacement pallet from a maximum height of 2.4 m. Naval Waste 
Package Drop with Emplacement Pallet (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1623461) performs these calculations 
at room temperature and 100°C to bound potential waste package operational temperatures. The 
results for the naval long waste package drop with the emplacement pallet are shown below. 
Table 42 presents the maximum stress intensity in the waste package outer corrosion barrier and 
inner vessel for each of the tem.perature conditions while loaded with the naval long waste 
package from a 0.782-m drop. 
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Table 43 shows the maximum stress intensity in the waste package outer corrosion barrier and 
inner vessel from a 2.4-m drop onto the emplacement pallet. 
Table 42. Maximum Stress Intensity for a Drop from 0.782 m while Loaded on the Emplacement Pallet 
Max Stress 
Part Temperature Intensity, olnt ~ i n t  I uu 
(MPa) 
Inner Vessel RT 244 0.35 
Outer Corrosion Barrier RT 308 0.32 
Inner Vessel 100°C 212 0.32 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 100°C 302 0.31 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2002 [DIRS 1623461, Table 6-3, p. 18 
Table 43. Maximum Stress lntensity for a Drop from 2.4 m onto the Emplacement Pallet 
Max Stress 
Part Temperature Intensity, mint Qint I QU 
(MPa) 
Inner Vessel RT 234 0.33 
Outer Corrosion Barrier RT 340 0.35 
Inner Vessel 100°C 202 0.30 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 100°C 302 0.31 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2002 [DIRS 1623461, Table 6-4, p. 18 
As a result of the two horizontal drop scenarios the emplacement pallet experiences stresses in 
excess of its yielding point in ali cases. These stresses range from 692 MPa (0.782-m drop at 
100°C) to 934 MPa (2.4-m drop at room temperature) (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1623461, Section 6, 
p. 18). This yielding is unimportant, as it does not cause breaching in the waste package, and the 
damaged emplacement pallet would be replaced before emplacement in the drift. The 
deformation of the emplacement pallet absorbs a tremendous amount of energy and lowers the 
stresses in the waste package considerably by this yielding during the impact. According to 
Table 42 and Table 43 the stresses in the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier are below seven 
tenths of the corresponding material ultimate tensile strengths in all scenarios. Therefore, no 
breach of the waste package is expected. 
7.1.2.2.8 Corner Drop of the Naval Long Waste Package 
The corner drop consists of raising the waste package vertically to a maximum height of 2.0 m 
(Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 5.2.8, p. 54). At this time the waste package swings 
possibly due to seismic occurrences. The lifting device carrying the waste package fails when 
the waste package has swung to the point where the center of gravity is vertically aligned with 
. the bottom corner of. the waste package. The waste package then .falls due to gravity and the 
waste package impacts an unyielding surface. Corner Drop of Naval Canistered SNF Long 
Waste Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1671651) performs this calculation at room temperature and 
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300°C to bound potential waste package operational temperatures. The maximum wall-averaged 
stress intensities for the comer drop of the naval long waste package from 2.0 m are shown in 
Table 44. 
Table 44. Wall-averaged Stress Intensities for a 2-m Drop 
Max Stress 
Part Temperature Intensity, oint aint I au 
(MPa) 
Inner Vessel RT 443 0.63 
Outer Corrosion Barrier RT 94 1 0.97 
Inner Vessel 300°C 364 0.59 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 300°C 871 0.96 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1671651, Table 6-3, p. 26 
From Table 44, the wall-averaged stress intensity values in the inner vessel are below seven 
tenths of the true ultimate tensile strength of stainless steel type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600). The wall- 
averaged stress intensity values in the outer corrosion barrier are above nine tenths of the 
ultimate tensile strength for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). Therefore, the outer corrosion barrier does 
not meet the plastic analysis criteria for a 2-m comer drop (see Section 7.1.2.2). 
Since the outer corrosion barrier does not meet the plastic analysis criteria defined in Section 
7.1.2.2, a 1-m drop at room temperature is performed to determine an allowable lifting height of 
the naval waste package. For a 1-m drop, only a room temperature comer drop is performed, 
since the room temperature case from Table 44 has proven to be the more bounding case of the 
two temperature conditions for 2-m drop. The 1-m drop results are presented in Table 45. 
Table 45. Wall-averaged Stress Intensities for a I -m Drop 
Max Stress 
Part Temperature Intensity, mint Dint 1 ~ I I  
(MPa) 
Outer Corrosion Barrier RT 388 0.40 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 1671651, Table 6-7, p. 28 
From Table 45, the wall-averaged stress intensity of the outer corrosion barrier is significantly 
below 70 percent of the ultimate tensile strength for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). Therefore, for a 
1-m comer drop of the naval waste package, no breach is expected. 
7.1.2.2.9 Naval Long Waste Package 10-Degree Oblique Drop with Slap Down 
The 10-degree oblique drop with slap down consists of raising the waste package horizontally to 
a maximum height of 2.4 m (see .Section 6.1.1.2 of this document). The lifting ,device carrying 
the bottom half of the waste package fails, and the bottom half of the waste package begins to 
fall due to gravity. After the bottom end has rotated 10 degrees, the lifting device holding the top 
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of the waste package fails and the entire waste package falls due to gravity. The waste package 
then impacts an unyielding surface with the bottom edge first followed by the top end. Naval 
SNF Long Waste Package 10 Degree Oblique Drop with Slap Down (BSC 2003 [DIRS 16708 11) 
performs the calculation at room temperature and 300°C to bound potential waste package 
operational temperatures. The results for the 10-degree oblique drop with slap down of the naval 
long waste package are shown in Table 46, presenting the maximum stress intensity at room 
temperature and 300°C. 
Table 46. Maximum Stress Intensity 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1670811, p. 19, Table 6-2 
For both temperature conditions the stresses in the outer corrosion barrier and inner vessel are 
less than 77 percent of the corresponding material ultimate tensile strength. Therefore no breach 
of the waste package is expected. 
7.1.2.2.10 Naval Long Waste Package Swing Down 
The swing down consists of raising the waste package horizontally to a maximum height of 
2.4 m (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, Section 5.2.8, p. 54). The lifting device carrying the top 
half of the waste package fails and the top of the waste package falls due to gravity. The waste 
package then impacts an unyielding surface with the top edge. Swing-Down of Naval Long 
Waste Package (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1618801) performs this calculation at room temperature, 
204"C, and 316°C to bound potential waste package operational temperatures. The results for 
the swing down of the naval long waste package are shown in Table 47. 
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Table 47. Maximum Stress Intensity 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 31 6°C 459 0.52 
Inner Vessel 316"Ca 51 6 0.86 
Inner Vessel Upper Lid 31 6% a 270 0.45 
Spread Ring 31 6% a 305 0.51 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 31 6'C a 452 0.50 
NOTE: RT = room temperature. 
a With modified elongation. 
Source: BSC 2002 [DIRS 1618801, Table 6-3, p. 43 
In all temperature conditions the outer corrosion barrier maximum stress intensity is below 70 
percent of the ultimate tensile strength. Therefore no breach of the waste package is expected. 
7.1.2.2.11 Waste Package Exposed to Vibratory Ground Motion 
The objective of Structural Calculations of Waste Package Exposed to Vibratory Ground Motion 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670831, Section 1) is to determine the residual stress distribution in the outer 
corrosion barrier of a waste package exposed to vibratory ground motion and estimate the area of 
the waste package outer corrosion barrier for which the residual stress exceeds threshold limits. 
This calculation has been performed for the 21-PWR waste package. Currently the same 
calculation has not been performed for any of the naval waste packages. However, the naval 
waste package design is similar. Given the nature and conservatism of the results, no significant 
change of results is anticipated for the naval waste package (see BSC 2004 [DIRS 1668761, 
Appendix A). 
7.1.2.3 Uncertainties of Structural Analyses 
In the past interactions with the NRC (Kelmenson 2000 [DIRS 1543501) sources of uncertainty 
and variability affecting structural analyses were discussed. This particularly dealt with finite 
element analysis representations and the failure criterion for waste package structural analyses. 
Six other'areas considered were: ' 
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1. Residual and differential thermal expansion stresses 
2. Strain-rate effects 
3. Dimensional and material variability 
4. Seismic effect on ground motion 
5. Initial tip-over velocities 
6. Sliding and inertial effect of waste package contents. 
At this time, additional uncertainties have not been identified. As the design progresses, any 
additional uncertainties that are identified will be addressed as part of the design process. These 
identified uncertainties will be documented within the documents supporting the license 
application. 
Finite Element Analysis Discretization and Failure Criterion-With regard to the adequacy 
of finite element analysis representations, a process has been developed to ensure that the mesh 
density is computationally adequate, and this process is followed for all structural calculations. 
The failure criterion is an application of the Tresca (strength of materials) failure criterion based 
on the implementation of ASME B&PV Code (ASME 200 1 [DIRS 158 1 151) design-by-analysis 
primary stress intensity limits. A tiered evaluation approach was implemented that used 
increasingly less simplified, and increasing less conservative screening criterion whose 
satisfaction will assure meeting the ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151) primary 
stress intensity limits. 
For the six specific areas of uncertainty concern, the responses may be summarized as: 
Residual and Differential Thermal Expansion Stresses-Differentia1 thermal 
expansion is accommodated by providing adequate gaps between the two shells that 
comprise the waste package to ensure that there is no mutual loading due to thermal 
expansion. For residual stresses purposefully imposed on the outer corrosion barrier, the 
effects on structural analysis results are found to be negligible. 
Strain-rate Effects-While material-specific strain-rate dependent properties are not 
currently available for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) and stainless steel type 316 (UNS 
S31600), parametric studies of such effects based on stainless steel type 304 (UNS 
S30400) strain-rate dependent properties have shown that the use of static properties has 
negligible effect on the safety assessment. 
Dimensional and Material Variability-Dimensional variability is addressed by 
assuming minimum dimensions for those parameters that are important to component 
performance. Material variability is accommodated by the use of ASME B&PV Code 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151)-and other codes as necessary-structural properties, 
which provide for minimum structural performance margins.. 
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Seismic Effect on Ground Motion-In the surface facility, in the transporter, and on the 
emplacement gantry, it is assumed that the fixturing is provided to restrain the waste 
package during evolutions in that facility, and these devices are sufficient to provide 
restraint during vibratory ground motion. For vibratory ground motion in the 
underground, results are provided for a seismic evaluation for an annual frequency of 
exceedance of 5x10-~ per year. These results show a very modest waste package 
movement and large margin to breach. 
Initial Tip-Over Velocities-A study has been performed to demonstrate that the 
increase in tip-over velocity due to credible vibratory ground motion causes a negligible 
increase in impact velocity. 
Sliding and Inertial Effect of Waste Package Contents-The waste form contents are 
represented in dynamic structural analyses for which such motion is anticipated to be 
important. Examples of the loads and boundary conditions used in calculations and 
analyses can be found in the supporting calculations (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551; BSC 
2003 [DIRS 1616911; BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670831; BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951; BSC 2003 
[DIRS 1654971). In addition, the technical bases and or rationale for the loads and 
boundary conditions used in calculations supporting the license application will be based 
on the preclosure safety analysis and derivative design constraints. 
7.1.2.3.1 Response to General Issue of Adequacy 
The section addresses the adequacy of the finite element analysis mesh discretization and the 
failure criterion. 
7.1.2.3.1.1 Mesh Discretization 
A set process is followed in the development of the mesh for finite element analysis that provides 
confidence that the results are stationary in a numerical sense (Mecham 2004 [DIRS 1661681, 
Section 6.2.3). 
The purpose of mesh refinement is to ensure the mesh objectivity of the finite element analyses, 
i.e., that the results obtained are not mesh-sensitive. The basis for the validity of this process of 
successive refinement is that it has been found to produce convergent stress fields in a systematic 
manner. The acceptable variations in the stress fields are well within the benchmarking basis for 
the LS-DYNA code (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1669181). A mesh-refinement study consists of the 
development of an optimum mesh that yields mesh-objective (mesh-insensitive) results. That 
mesh is then refined again, and computational results for the two mesh sizes are compared. The 
finite element representation is considered mesh-objective if the relative difference in results 
(e-g., stresses) between the two meshes is approximately an order of magnitude smaller than the 
relative difference in mesh size in the region of interest; otherwise further mesh refinement is 
needed. The mesh size, as used throughout this section, refers to the volume or the area of the 
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representative element (three-dimensional or two-dimensional, respectively) in the region of 
interest (for example, the element characterized by the highest stresses or strains). 
The optimum mesh is created by the following sequence of steps: 
The initial mesh is created by following the customary engineering practices: the 
element type is appropriately chosen; the mesh is refined in the regions of interest (the 
highest stresslstrain regions, initial impact regions, stress concentration regions, etc.); 
the mesh is mapped whenever possible; and the aspect ratio of elements is kept 
reasonable. 
The initial mesh is-in the region of interest-refined in one direction while the element 
size in the other two directions is kept unchanged (for example, the mesh is refined 
across the thickness while kept unchanged in the hoop and axial directions). The mesh- 
refinement procedure is repeated in this manner until the relative difference in results 
between the two successive meshes is acceptable (i.e., approximately an order of 
magnitude smaller than the relative difference in the mesh size). The mesh dimension in 
this direction is then fixed at the largest value that satisfied the previously mentioned 
criterion. 
The intention of this one-direction-at-a-time mesh refinement is to create, in a consistent 
and systematic manner, a mesh that is objective. 
The same is consecutively repeated in the remaining two directions. 
Whether the created mesh meets the requirement is verified by the final step: the 
simultaneous mesh refinement in all three directions. The level of this mesh refinement 
should be similar in all three directions. In this final step, the same mesh-acceptance 
criterion is invoked: the mesh is considered objective if the relative difference in results 
(e.g., stresses) between the two meshes is approximately an order of magnitude smaller 
than the relative difference in mesh size in the region of interest. 
It should be emphasized that the mesh objectivity is verified by the final step regardless of 
whether the final mesh is arrived at by the described one-direction-at-a-time mesh refinement or 
not. The one-direction-at-a-time mesh refinement is optional since its only purpose is to develop 
an optimum mesh (that satisfies the mesh-objectivity requirement) in a systematic way. 
An example of the implementation of this mesh discretization approach may be found in the 
calculation entitled 44-B WR Waste Package Tip-Over from an Elevated Surface (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 1667951). While all calculations perform such discretization studies, this calculation is 
selected because it is'the vehicle cited in the balance of this section'to assess the importance of 
strain rates (Section 7.1.2.3.2.2) and initial tip-over velocities (Section 7.1.2.3.2.5). 
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7.1.2.3.1.2 Selection of the Failure Criterion 
For structural analyses of preliminary designs that consider material nonlinear behavior, the 
maximum-shear-stress or Tresca (strength of materials) criterion is used in determining stress 
limits. In general terms, this criterion assumes that the design is safe as long as stress intensity 
(defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum principal stress) remains below a 
certain limit. In particular, the failure criterion chosen was the acceptance criteria for plastic 
analysis outlined in Appendix F, F-1341.2 of the ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
158 1 151 Section 111, Division 1, Appendix F). This is an acceptable vessel designer choice of 
ASME B&PV Code acceptance criteria for service loadings with Level D Service Limits for 
vessel designs in accordance with NC-3200 (Safety Class 2 Vessels) when a complete stress 
analysis is performed. (See ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, NC-3211 .l(c), Appendix XI11 and 
Note (4) to Table NC-3217-1). 
The ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix F, 
F-1341.2) suggests the following primary stress intensity limits for plastic analyses: 
The general primary membrane stress intensity shall not exceed 0.7 S, for ferritic steel 
materials included in Section 11, Part D, Subpart 1, Table 2A and the greater of 0.7 S, 
and S, + ' 13  (S, - S,) for austenitic steel, high-nickel alloy, and copper-nickel alloy 
materials included in Section 11, Part D, Subpart 1, Table 2A, where S, and S, are tensile 
strength and yield strength, respectively. 
The maximum primary stress intensity at any location shall not exceed 0.9 S,. 
The Pressure Vessel Research Council of the Welding Research Council has provided 
recommended guidelines (Hechrner 1998 [DIRS 1661471) to the ASME B&PV Code rule 
committees for assessing stress results from three-dimensional finite element analysis in terms of 
ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 11 51, stress limits in the design-by-analysis rules of 
Section I11 (Class 1, NB) and Section VIII, Division 2). These guidelines were developed for 
linear analyses and Pressure Vessel Research Council recommends that future research work 
should be conducted to generate state-of-the-art guidelines for applying inelastic, large- 
deformation analyses. Therefore, a cautious use of the Pressure Vessel Research Council 
recommendations was made in developing methodologies for post-processing LS-DYNA 
nonlinear plastic simulations to assure conservative representations of the general primary 
membrane stress intensity and maximum primary stress intensity. 
The Pressure Vessel Research Council recommendations also refer to an earlier Pressure Vessel 
Research Council (Phase 1) report that recommended ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
1581 15]), Appendix F "should be revised to provide a limit on effective plastic strain which is 
more appropriate for events that are energy controlled, rather than load controlled, which is all 
that was considered when ASME B&PV Code Appendix F was written." The Yucca Mountain 
Project recognizes that strain-based or deformation-based criterion may be more appropriate than 
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stress-based limits for evaluation of the credible preclosure sequence events (see Mecharn 2003 
[DIRS 1661681, Section 4.1.4.1). However, the project is also committed to applying the ASME 
B&PV Code for structural analyses, and until the ASME B&PV Code rule committees prepare 
rules in ASME B&PV Code Appendix F for using strain limits, primary stress intensity limits 
will be used. 
The ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151) design-by-analysis guidance recognizes 
the differences in importance of different types of stresses and provides guidance on their correct 
assignment to the different categories of stress intensity used to evaluate different types of failure 
modes. The three types of stresses are membrane, bending and peak stresses. The three 
categories of stress intensity are primary (P,, P, and P, [general primary membrane, local 
primary membrane, and primary bending, respectively]), secondary (Q), and peak (F). 
A primary stress is defined in ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, 
Division 1, Appendix XIII) XIII-1123(h): "Primary stress is a normal stress developed by the 
imposed loading which is necessary to satisfy the laws of equilibrium of external and internal 
forces and moments. The basic characteristic of a primary stress is that it is not self-limiting. 
Primary stresses which considerably exceed the yield strength will result in failure or, at least, in 
gross distortion." 
A secondary stress is defined in ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, 
Division 1, Appendix XIII) XIII-1123(i): "Secondary stress is a normal or a shear stress 
developed by the constraint of adjacent parts or by self-constraint of the structure. The basic 
characteristic of a secondary stress is that it is self-limiting. Local ylelding and minor distortions , 
can satisfy the conditions which cause the stress to occur and failure from one application of the 
stress is not expected." A cited example of a secondary stress is "bending stress at a gross 
structural discontinuity." A gross structural discontinuity is defined in ASME B&PV Code 
(ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII) XIII-1123(b): "Gross 
structural discontinuity is a source of stress or strain intensification which affects a relatively 
large portion of a structure and has a significant effect on the overall stress or strain pattern or on 
the structure as a whole." Cited examples of gross structural discontinuities are head-to-shell 
junctions and junctions between shells of different thickness. 
A local primary membrane stress is also defined in ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 
158 1 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII) XIII-1123(j): "Cases arise in which a 
membrane stress produced by pressure or other mechanical loading and associated with a 
discontinuity would, if not limited, produce excessive distortion in the transfer of load to other 
portions of the structure. Conservatism requires that such a stress be classified as a local 
primary-membrane stress even though it has some characteristics of a secondary stress." The 
other differentiating feature of a local primary membrane stress is that it is localized, and ASME 
. B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151) guidance is provided for evaluating if membrane 
stress fields are adequately "local" to be assigned a PL classification rather than a more restrictive 
P, classification. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 65 of 98 
Per Pressure Vessel Research Council recommendations (Hechrner 1 998 [DIRS 166 1471, 
Guideline 1) the failure mode being addressed by the general primary membrane stress intensity 
(P,) limit is "collapse" in the sense that collapse includes tensile instability and ductile rupture 
under short term loading. The principle failure mode being addressed by the maximum primary 
stress intensity (PL + Pb) is excessive plastic deformation. However, it also relates to tensile 
instability due to the nature of Pb . 
The sequence events considered in this report are not repetitive where fatigue cracking or 
incremental collapse might be an issue. It follows that evaluation of secondary stress intensities 
(Q) or maximum total stress intensities (PL + Pb + Q + F) are not appropriate. Brittle fracture is 
also precluded by the high ductility of the outer boundary material, Alloy 22 (UNS N06022), at 
the temperatures experienced after waste form loading. Although the high-stress areas are 
comprised of primary, secondary and peak stresses, only the primary stress intensities (P,, PL 
and Pb) contribute to plastic instability (tensile tearing) or excessive plastic deformation, and 
therefore, only the primary stress intensities are evaluated for the sequence events. 
Use was also made of the stress classification guidance in the ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 
[DIRS 158 1 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix XIII) Table XIII- 1 130- 1 to determine which 
stress fields should be classified as primary and which should be classified as secondary when 
evaluating the sequence events. It was decided to conservatively classify all membrane stress 
fields as primary. Classification of the bending stresses was more involved. 
Review of representative analyses for the sequence events indicated that the most significant 
wall-bending stresses in the outer corrosion barrier were occurring near gross structural 
discontinuities. Some of these gross structural discontinuities were integral to the outer 
boundary and some were introduced by the constraint of adjacent parts or impact surfaces. 
The integral gross discontinuities in the outer corrosion barrier are similar to Code vessel details 
such as shell-to-lid junctures and step-changes in wall thickness. The bending stresses are being 
created by self-constraint, and Table XIII-1130-1 (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, Section 111, 
Division 1, Appendix XIII) classifies these bending stresses as secondary. The only exception is 
at the shell-lid junction where concern about the predictability of the lid's central stresses leads 
the Code to caution the designer (ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151, Section 111, Division 1, Appendix 
XIII, Note (4) of Table XIII-1130-1) to consider classifying the bending stresses as Pb. 
However, this is not appropriate guidance for inelastic analyses because the increased flexibility 
of the juncture due to inelastic behavior is correctly captured and the lid's central stresses are 
accurately predicted. 
The bending stresses created by the constraint of adjacent parts or impact surfaces (which can be 
considered (temporary) "adjacent parts") were reviewed on individual cases with attention to the 
amount and type of constraint introduced. In the design analyses to date, the. constraint of the 
adjacent part (e.g., trunnion sleeve) or impact surface (e.g., emplacement pallet, crane hook or 
rock) created local yielding and minor distortions in the outer barrier. The outer corrosion 
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barrier distorted shape reduced the outer corrosion barrier bending stresses while increasing the 
outer corrosion barrier membrane stresses. The bending stresses in these locally yielded regions 
are therefore self-limiting and satisfy the basic characteristic of a secondary stress. 
The structural criterion developed for the outer boundary for the sequence events was to directly 
address the dominant failure mode, tensile instability, and limit the membrane stresses to 
acceptable limits. The use of inelastic analyses assures that local thinning or shape changes that 
could increase membrane stresses are properly accounted for. 
The inelastic analyses were conducted using true stress (a,) and true strain based 
load/deformation relationships, therefore, per ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 1581 151, 
Section 111, Division 1, Appendix F, F-1322.3(b) and F-1341.2), for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022): 
The limit on P, is 0.7au, and 
the limit on PL is 0.90, ,where PI, = 0, and 
a, is the true tensile strength at temperature. 
As stated earlier, the ASME B&PV Code (ASME 2001 [DIRS 158 1 151, Section III, Division 1, 
Appendix XIII, XIII-11230)) provides guidance on how "local" PL must be to not be classified 
as a more restrictive general primary membrane stress intensity, P, . Interpretation of this 
guidance with respect to the Appendix F limits results in requiring PL values exceeding 0.770, to 
not extend for greater than & in any direction (not just the meridional direction), where R is 
the midsurface radius and t is the thickness of the outer barrier. 
Rigorously performed, the calculation of the primary membrane stress intensities requires the 
following steps: 
a Identification of the governing wall location (stress classification plane normal to the 
mid-plane of the shell or lid thickness) which may not necessarily contain the maximum 
stressed point (Hechmer 1998 [DIRS 1661471, Guidelines 3 and 4) 
Identification of the orientation of the stress classification line (SCL), typically normal to 
the mid-plane of the shell or lid thickness (Hechmer 1998, Guideline 4d). 
a Identification of stress component ( a , ,  a, , o, , z, , z, , z, ) fields across the wall of the 
outer corrosion barrier 
Averaging of the stress component fields to create wall-averaged stress components 
Translation of these wall-averaged stresses to principle stress directions by solving a 
cubic equation 
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Calculation of the difference between the maximum ( a , )  and minimum (a , )  principle 
stress direction values. 
To simplify the calculation, the wall-average of the element total stress intensity (twice the 
maximum shear stress) values through the outer corrosion barrier is used to define the primary 
membrane stress intensities. This is a conservative representation because it ignores the possible 
changing of the principle stress planes through the wall and includes the secondary and peak 
stress contributions. 
To further simplify the calculation, tiered screening criteria are applied to the outer corrosion 
barrier finite element analysis results. The easiest to apply and most conservative criteria are 
applied initially. If these can not be met, less conservative screening criteria are imposed that 
require more calculations. 
In the case of lifting analyses, the acceptance criteria are outlined in American National Standard 
for Radioactive Materials-Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 
Pounds (4500 kg) or More (ANSI N14.6-1993 [DIRS 1020161, Section 4.2.1.1). The load- 
bearing members of the lifting device shall be capable of lifting three times the combined weight 
of the shipping container, plus the weight of the intervening components of the lifting device, 
without generating a combined shear stress or maximum principal stress at any point in the 
device in excess of S, and shall also be capable of lifting five times the weight without exceeding 
su. 
7.1.2.3.2 Responses to Specific Issues 
The following sections address the specific issues enumerated in Section 7.1.2.3. 
7.1.2.3.2.1 Residual and Differential Thermal Expansion Stresses 
7.1.2.3.2.1.1 Differential Thermal Expansion 
Differential thermal expansion is accommodated by providing adequate gaps between the inner 
vessel and outer corrosion barrier to ensure that there is no mutual loading due to thermal 
expansion. The required radial gap between the inner vessel and the outer corrosion barrier of 
the waste package is documented in a calculation entitled Waste Package Outer Barrier Stress 
Due to Thermal Expansion with Various Barrier Gap Sizes (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551). This 
calculation resulted in a minimum gap spacing between the inner vessel and outer corrosion 
barrier to accommodate radial expansion to be set at 1 mm (BSC 2001 [DIRS 1526551, Tables 4 
and 5, p. 13). The axial gap between the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier and the lids of 
each is documented in a calculation entitled Waste Package Axial Thermal Expansion 
Calculation (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1616911). This calculation established a minimum axial gap of 1 
cm between the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1616911, Section 7, 
p. 13). A similar approach will be used to ensure clearance between the inner vessel of the waste 
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package and the internals. These clearances are addressed in the two naval configuration 
drawings: 
Naval Long Waste Package Configuration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648541). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1581) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 159]), respectively. 
Naval Short Waste Package ConJiguration (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1648551). Sheets 2 and 3 
are found in BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 1601) and BSC (2003 [DIRS 165 161]), respectively. 
7.1.2.3.2.1.2 Effect of Residual Stresses 
The waste package outer corrosion barrier is not in a stress-free condition at the beginning of 
service life due to residual stresses purposefully induced by solution annealing and quenching. 
The purpose of these residual stress fields is to create compressive residual stresses at the outside 
surface, and perhaps the inside surface as well (depending on the quenching techniques) of the 
outer corrosion barrier to help mitigate corrosion. The effect of this stress profile on the waste 
package during dynamic events is documented in a calculation entitled Drop of Waste Package 
on Emplacement Pallet-A Mesh Study (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654971). While this calculation was 
prepared for a postclosure evaluation, it illustrates the basic physics of the phenomenon, and the 
conclusions are equally appropriate for preclosure evaluations of preclosure dynamic structural 
calculations. 
The residual stresses due to the solution annealing and quenching are analyzed for a mockup 
waste package outer corrosion barrier in Residual Stress Analyses on the 21 P WR Mockup Waste 
Package Outer Shell Due to Quenching and General corrosion Using a Side-wall Thickness of 
20mm (Herrera et al. 2002 [DIRS 1667991). The residual stress analyses are performed for two 
different quenching techniques: (1) the outside quench (on the outside surface only) and (2) the 
double-sided quench (on both the inside and outside surfaces). The results reported herein 
correspond only to the residual stress distribution due to the double-sided quenching. 
It must be recognized that the accuracy of this study is limited by the through-wall discretization 
of the outer corrosion barrier. Since only four layers of solid (brick) elements are used for the 
finite element analysis representation of the outer corrosion barrier in this calculation, the 
residual stress distribution is necessarily rather coarse. Furthermore, the one-point-integration 
solid elements used in this calculation are not best suited for the representation of the initial 
stress distribution. Nonetheless, no change has been made in the finite element analysis 
representation for the residual stress calculations since it was important to make a comparison 
between the results obtained by using the same representation, which was defined 
(representation) by the objective of the source calculation (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1654971). 
Two different magnitudes of the initial stress distribution are used in this study to explore , a  
sensitivity of results to the details of the stress distribution. (Note the schematic representation 
of the residual stress distribution-generic for both hoop and axial direction-presented as the 
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dotted green line [a] in Figure 8). In the first approximation, the initial stress (i.e., the residual 
stress caused by the annealing and quenching) in each layer of elements is defined by using the 
maximum stress value reached anywhere within the element layer (the dashed line [b] in Figure 
8; see also row "Full" in Table 48). In the second approximation, the initial stress in each layer 
of elements is obtained by averaging the actual stress distribution (the green dotted line [a] in 
Figure 8) over the element layer. Keeping in mind the actual residual stress distribution, the 
averaging is performed by assigning to the approximated initial stress distribution one half of the 
maximum stress value reached anywhere within each element layer (solid line [c] in Figure 8; 
see also row "Half' in Table 48). The approximated initial stress distributions are presented in 
Figure 8. The actual stress values are obtained from Herrera et al. (2002 [DIRS 1667991, Figures 
48 and 52). For the axial stress distribution the maximum compressive stress at both the inside 
and outside surface is C = -300MPa; the maximum tensile stress at the middle surface is 
T = 15OMPa . For the hoop stress profile the maximum compressive stress at both inside and 
outside surface is C = -260MPa; the maximum tensile stress at the middle surface is 
T = 190MPa . 
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The calculations are performed for the horizontal drop of the waste package on the pallet with 
impact speed of 8 m/s . 
The results are presented in Table 48. The row designated with "No" represents the initially 
stress-free case (i.e., without the initial stress). The results obtained by using the first and second 
initial stress approximations are presented in rows "Full" and "Half," respectively. 
Table 48. Results for Three Different Initial Stress Approximations 
Damaged Area 
Magnitude of Maximum Effective (80% Maximum Stress Strain Residual Stress Intensity (MPa) ("4 criterion) (XI om3 m21a 
No 630 30.3 7.47 12.46 
Half 632 30.4 6.41 12.29 
FIIII 631 30.7 5.82 12.21 
NOTE: a This is the percentage of yield stress and is used in postclosure seismic analyses as a 
measure of susceptibility to accelerated corrosion. 
Source: BSC2003 [DIRS 1654971, Table VII-I 
According to results presented, the maximum stress intensity and the maximum effective plastic 
strain are not significantly affected by presence of the initial stress (i.e., the residual stress caused 
by the solution annealing and double-sided quenching). The damaged area is moderately 
sensitive to the initial stresses. The damaged area is used in postclosure analyses to assess the 
susceptibility to accelerated corrosion, which is not important for preclosure safety. 
7.1.2.3.2.2 Strain-Rate Effects 
The plastic behavior of materials is sensitive to strain rate, which is known as material strain-rate 
sensitivity. The strain-rate data for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) and stainless steel type 316 (UNS 
S31600) (the stress-strain curves for different strain rates or the change of a characteristic stress 
with strain rate) are not available in literature at present. Thus, the effect of strain rate on the 
mechanical strengths of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) and stainless steel type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600) was 
studied parametrically by using as a guidance the strain-rate data for stainless steel type 304 
(UNS S30400) (Nicholas 1980 [DIRS 1540721, Figures 10 and 27) for both materials. Stainless 
steel type 304 (UNS S30400) is used as an analogue for stainless steel type 316 (UNS S31600) 
and Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) insofar as strain rate effects are concerned. The tangent 
(hardening) moduli for Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) and stainless steel type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600) are 
assumed fo be unaffected by the rate of loading. The rationale is that according to the document, 
Dynamic Tensile Testing of Structural Materials Using A Split Hopkinson Bar Apparatus 
(Nicholas 1980 [DIRS 1540721, Figure lo), the tangent modulus for stainless steel type 304 
(UNS S30400) is not significantly affected by the strain rate. This evaluation is documented in a 
calculation, entitled 44-B WR Waste Package Tip-Over from an Elevated Surface (BSC 2003 
[DIRS 166795 1). 
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Strain rate is accounted for in this study by using Cowper and Symonds approach that scales the 
yield strength with the factor: 
Here i is the strain rate, and C and p are input parameters obtained by fitting the experimental 
data (Hallquist 1998 [DIRS 1553731, p. 16.37). 
The test results provided for stainless steel type 304 (UNS S30400) are used to establish 
reasonable limits for strain-rate factor P. The results obtained at strain rates of 20 s-' and 900 s-' 
are selected (Nicholas 1980 [DIRS 1540721, Figures 10 and 27) for fitting of the strain-rate 
parameters, since those two values adequately span the strain-rate range relevant for this 
calculation. From that data (Nicholas 1980 [DIRS 1540721, Figure 27, curve 304, E = 0.10 ) 
To establish the upper bound for strain-rate effects, the change of stress of 13.5 percent at strain 
rate of 20 s-' (compared to the static test) is increased to 20 percent (corresponding to relative 
increase of 50 percent). Thus, for the upper bound, /3(i = 20 s-I ) = 1.20. Similarly, the change 
of stress of 37 percent at strain rate of 900 s-' (compared to the static test) is increased to 55 
percent (corresponding to relative increase of 50 percent); this value is then rounded to 60 
percent. Thus, for the upper bound, /3(i = 900s-' )= 1.60. 
Results for stainless steel type 304 (UNS S30400) from two additional sources are also presented 
in the source document for this data (Nicholas 1980 [DIRS 1540721, Figure 27). All three test 
results from this source document are used to establish the lower bound for the strain-rate factor 
p , /3(i = 20s-' ) = 1.05 and /3(i = 900s-' ) = 1.15 . The purpose of this lower bound is to 
explore sensitivity of results with regards to the amount of the strain-rate strengthening of 
material. 
In summary, the scale factor p corresponding to strain rate of 20 s-' is 1.05 and 1.20 for the lower 
and upper bounds, respectively (see Table 49). The scale factor P corresponding to strain rate of 
900 s-' is 1.15 and 1.60 for the lower and upper bounds, respectively (Table 49). Note that at 
both strain rates the increase of stress (expressed as percent increase compared to the static 
value) from the lower to the upper bound is four times. Also, for both the upper and lower 
bound the increase of stress (expressed as percent increase compared to the static value) from 
20 s-' to 900 s-' is three times. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 75 of 98 
Table 49. Strain-Rate Parameters 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
~ ( 2 0  s-' ) 1.05 1.20 
~ ( 9 0 0  s-' ) 1.15 1.60 
P 3.465 3.465 
C 644,300 5,284 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Table 5 
These values can be used as boundary conditions for determination of strain-rate parameters in 
Table 49. For example for the lower bound, the expression, 
is obtained by substituting the first boundary condition ( ~ ( i  = 20 s-' ) = 1.05 ) in Equation 1. 
Similarly, by substituting ( ~ ( i  = 900 s-' ) = 1.15 ) in Equation 1, 
and adding Equation 4, the parameter p can be readily calculated: 
From Equation 4 it follows directly that C = 644,300s-' . 
By repeating the same calculation for the upper-bound values of P the following parameters can 
be readily obtained, p = 3.465 and C = 5,284s-' (see Table 49). 
Three calculations are performed to explore the strain-rate sensitivity of results presented in this 
calculation (see Table 50 and Table 52). The first calculation is performed with static material 
properties without strain-rate effects accounted for (row "No" in Table 50 and Table 52). The 
second calculation corresponds to the lower-bound strain-rate sensitivity (row "Low" in Table 50 
and Table 52). Finally, the third calculation is performed with highly rate-sensitive material 
strengths (row "High" in Table 50 and Table 52, corresponding to the upper-bound strain-rate 
parameters in Table 49). 
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Table 50. Maximum Stress lntensity in Outer Corrosion Barrier and lnner Vessel for Three Different 
Levels of Strain-Rate Sensitivity 
Strain-rate 
Sensitivity Inner Vessel Outer Corrosion Barrier 
1,037 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Table V-2 
Maximum stress intensity, as expected, increases with increased strain-rate sensitivity of the 
material strengths (see Table 50). The strain-rate strengthening of material implies increase of 
the true tensile strength, which must be quantified in order to make a meaningful assessment of 
the material condition upon deformation. 
The strain rates encountered in the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier, at the time when the 
maximum stress intensities occur, are determined from Figure 11 and presented in Table 5 1. 
Note that the effective-strain time histories presented in Figure 11 correspond to elements 
characterized by the maximum stress intensity (presented in Table 50), i.e., elements 27077 and 
27078 (inner vessel) and element 10174 (outer corrosion barrier). Strain-rate factor P is then 
calculated using Equation 1 for the strain-rate parameters (presented in Table 49) and the strain 
rate (presented in Table 51). Finally, the true tensile strengths of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) and 
stainless steel type 3 16 (UNS S3 1600) are scaled by the factor P. 
Table 51. Parameters Defining Strain-Rate Sensitivity for lnner Vessel and Outer Corrosion Barrier at 
the Time Characterized by Maximum Stress Intensity 
Strain Rate (11s) Strain-Rate Factor Q(-) True Tensile Strength Strain-rate (MPa) Sensitivity lnner Vessel 
No NIA 1 703 
Low 11 1.042 733 
High 11 1.168 82 1 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 
No NIA 1 971 
Low 8 1.038 1,008 
High 8 1.154 1,121 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Table V-3 
The ratio of the maximum stress intensity and true tensile strength is calculated for the inner 
vessel and outer corrosion barrier for all three strain-rate sensitivity cases. In other words, the 
maximum stress intensity (Table 50) is divided by the strain-rate-scaled true tensile strength 
(Table 5 1). The calculation results are presented in Table 52. 
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Table 52. Ratio of Maximum Stress Intensity and True Tensile Strength in Outer Corrosion Barrier and 
lnner Vessel for Three Different Levels of Strain-Rate Sensitivity 
Strain-rate - n ~ n t  1 nu 
Sensitivity Outer Corrosion Inner Vessel Barrier 
No 0.74 0.93 
Low 0.72 0.94 
High 0.73 0.93 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Table V-4 
Based on the results presented in Table 52, it can be concluded that: 
1. The level of strain-rate sensitivity (i.e., "Low" vs. "High") does not have a significant 
effect on the ratio of the maximum stress intensity and true tensile strength. 
2. The use of the static material properties for the tip-over calculation does not have a 
significant effect on the ratio of the maximum stress intensity and true tensile strength. 
Finally, it is important to note that the strain rates reported in Table 51 are the strain rates 
corresponding to times when the maximum stress intensities are recorded (as an example, for the 
outer corrosion barrier it is 0.007 s). At that time, the strain rate in the outer corrosion barrier is 
in rapid decline. Specifically, for the element characterized by the maximum stress intensity 
(element 10174; see Figure 11) it is reduced from 70 s-I to 8 s-'. This raises fundamental 
questions. If a material is strengthened by elevated-strain-rate loading and then the rate of 
loading is reduced, is material strength going to reduce as well? If that is so, what is the 
characteristic time related to that strength reduction? Can it possibly happen "instantaneously"? 
These important questions are not addressed in available literature at present. Answering these, 
and similar, questions would require a detailed insight into mechanical and metallurgical aspects 
of the strain-rate strengthening of material. However, this is not necessary because the effect of 
strain-rate strengthening of the material is conservatively accounted for in this calculation by 
scaling the true tensile strength with the strain-rate factor P corresponding to the instantaneous 
strain rate at the time when the maximum stress intensity occurs. (As an example, if the strain 
rate of 70 s-' could be used instead of 8 s-' to scale the true tensile strength for the "High" outer 
corrosion barrier bound, the increase of the true tensile strength would be from 
oU (k = 8 s-' ) = 1,12 1 MPa to o, (i = 70 s-' ) = 1,250 MPa , which would imply the reduction of 
the stress ratio from 0.93 to 0.90.) 
Therefore, based on the parametric study for strain-rate effects using stainless steel type 304 
(UNS S30400) strain-rate dependent properties, it has been demonstrated that the use of static 
properties for stainless steel type 316 (UNS S31600) and Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) in lieu of 
material specific strain-rate effects is appropriate. 
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7.1.2.3.2.3 Dimensional and Material Variability 
All structural calculations assume the thicknesses for the inner vessel and outer corrosion barrier 
are the minimum material thicknesses. Future drawings will indicate tolerances that show these 
dimensions as minimum values. This assures structural design requirements will be achieved. 
Maintaining conservative answers due to material variability is managed by using the minimum 
material-property strengths available (e.g., from the ASME B&PV code and other codes). When 
available, material properties that are temperature dependent are used for variable-temperature 
environment calculations. In general, when a range of values is given for material properties, the 
values that ensure conservative results are used. 
7.1.2.3.2.4 Seismic Effect on Ground Motion 
In the surface facility, it is assumed that the fixtures are provided to restrain the waste package 
during evolutions in that facility, and these devices are sufficient to provide restraint during 
vibratory ground motion. For vibratory ground motion in the underground, margin to the breach 
of the waste has been calculated for vibratory ground motion with an annual exceedance 
frequency (annual frequency of occurrence) of 5x10-~ per year. For this calculation, the motion 
of the waste package was very small, on the order of fractions of millimeters as illustrated in 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1670831, Section 6.3, pp. 63 to 64). 
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toppling to impact, "I" is the moment of inertia of the waste package, and "a" is the angular 
velocity. 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Figure 5-1 
Figure 14. Waste Package Position at Maximum Potential Energy 
Evaluating this expression, 
Here, "ofl is the initial angular velocity. 
The PGV has a value of 0.4378 m/s (DTN: M00306SDSAVDTH.000 [DIRS 1640331) on the 
repository horizon, yielding: 
PGV (lo4 event) = 0.4378 m/s = VO 
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(The only ground motions available for this frequency of exceedance are for the repository 
horizon. Subsequent to the performance of this work, the PGV for an annual frequency of 
exceedance of 1 x 1 o - ~  per year at the surface became available (DTN: MOO3 12 WHBDE 104.00 1 
[DIRS 167 1261). This PGV is 1.17 m/s, which is about three times the velocity at the repository 
horizon. The corresponding PGVs at the surface are higher and are covered by the sensitivity 
study range.) 
Finally, 
In this equation, "HI" is the distance from the center of gravity of the waste package to the 
bottom edge of the waste package at the point of toppling (see Figure 14). 
Note that predicted PGV-albeit at the repository horizon-results in a negligible change in the 
rotational velocity at impact. 
Table 53. Resultant Impact Velocities by Parameter 
Parameter 
radls 
PGV*O 
PGV*I 0.438 0.161 
PGV*5 2.19 0.812 
PGV*10 4.38 2.79 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Table IV-I 
The resulting maximum stress intensities for this sensitivity study are shown in Table 54. While 
substantial increases in initial tip-over velocity result in higher stress levels, the effect is modest 
and is clearly a second-order effect. Further, for the PGV to be a significant contributor to the 
angular velocity at impact, the fixturing must fail; the waste package must reach the imminent- 
toppling configuration at the time of PGV; and the PGV must be applied in the proper direction. 
These considerations support the conclusion that the current treatment of initial velocity for tip- 
over calculations is appropriate. 
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Table 54. Resultant Maximum Stress Intensity by Parameter 
PGV*O 
PGV*5 
Part 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Inner Vessel 
Inner Lid 
Spread Ring 
PGV* 1 0 
Source: BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, Table IV-2 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Inner Vessel 
Inner Lid 
- -. . .- 
7.1.2.3.2.6 Sliding and Inertial Effect of Waste Package Contents 
aint (MPa) 
902 , 
51 8 
426 
286 
Spread Ring 
Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Inner Vessel 
Inner Lid 
Spread Ring 
Inertial effects of waste package contents are an intrinsic part of dynamic structural calculations 
performed explicitly by finite element analysis codes. Sliding effects of waste package contents 
during impacts are evaluated in calculations where the movement of such contents is reasonably 
anticipated to affect the kinematics and the resulting stress fields. Coefficients of friction are 
used based on the materials and situation. An example of the treatment of the waste package 
contents is the calculation entitled 44-B WR Waste Package Tip-Over from an Elevated Surface 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951). In this calculation, the internals of the waste package and the 
commercial spent nuclear fuel assemblies are represented (BSC 2003 [DIRS 1667951, 
Section 5.3, p. 17). 
Oint I QLI 
0.93 
0.74 
0.61 
0.41 
944 
558 
442 
When the waste package contents are not considered as important to the resulting measures of 
waste package performance, those contents are often simplified so that the mass and inertial 
effects are maintained but geometry is simplified. 
0.97 
0.79 
0.63 
292 
1079 
644 
478 
302 
7.2 POSTCLOSURE 
0.42 
1 .I 
0.92 
0.68 
0.43 
7.2.1.1 Thermal 
The thermal calculations for normal operations are performed continuously through preclosure 
and postclosure times. Details are given in Section 7.1.1.1 above. 
7.2.1.2 Structural 
7.2.1.2.1 Static Waste Package on Pallet 
For each of the waste packages three different variations in radial gap between the inner vessel 
and outer corrosion barrier were executed to produce a parametric result. This was done to 
create a solution that can be used for later modifications to the design. The radial gap sizes 
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evaluated were 4 mm, 10 mrn, and 15 mm. Table 55 from Static Waste Packages on 
Emplacement Pallet (BSC 2002 [DIRS 1654921, Table 6-2, p. 11) shows that the Naval Long 
waste package is capable of supporting its own weight when on the emplacement pallet. 
Table 55. Maximum Stresses Intensities in Outer Corrosion Barrier 
Source: BSC 2002 [DIRS 1654921, Table 6-2, p. 11 
Waste Package 
21-PWR 
44-BW R 
Naval Long 
5 DHLWIDOE SNF-Short 
The stresses reported are less than the yield stress of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). The yield stress 
of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) may be found in Section 5.3.2, Table 2 of this document. Therefore, 
the waste package is able to withstand the stresses of its own weight even after 10,000 years of 
degradation. 
7.2.1.2.2 Postclosure Seismic Activity 
4 mm Radial Gap 
(MPa) 
90 
86 
74 
20 
For waste package postclosure seismic related issues refer to Appendix A of Commercial SNF 
Waste Package Design Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 1668761, Appendix A). 
8. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Operational requirements are discussed in this section. Functional requirements are taken from 
Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package System Description Document (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
1654271). The applicability of the functional requirement for compliance demonstration by 
Waste Package and Components is also noted. 
10 mm Radial Gap 
(MPa) 
80 
80 
84 
42 
8.1 INFERFACE REQUIREMENTS 
15 mm Radial Gap 
(MPa) 
90 
116 
76 
52 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.3.1 
Functional Requirement Title: Waste Package Handling Limits 
Functional Requirement Text: Waste package handling shall not introduce any surface defect in 
the corrosion barrier exceeding those identified by performance assessment and on interface 
exchange drawings. Surface defects include, but are not limited to, scratches, nicks, dents, and 
permanent changes to the surface stress condition (Table 56). 
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Table 56. Waste Package Handling Limits Performance Requirements 
Functional Requirement Number: 3.1.3.2 
Performance 
Requirement 
Number 
1 
Functional Requirement Title: Waste Package Closure 
Functional Requirement Text: Sealing operations shall be performed on the waste package 
(Table 57). 
Performance Requirement Text 
This issue is under investigation and will be resolved prior to construction 
authorization. 
Table 57. Waste Package Closure Performance Requirements 
Applicability 
Yes 
8.2 INTERFACE WITH OTHER SYSTEMS 
Performance 
Requirement 
Number 
1 
The loaded waste package has its final closure performed by the waste package closure system in 
accordance with Section 3.1.3, Functional Requirement Number 3.1.3.2 of BSC (2003 [DIRS 
165427]), at which time it assumes its preclosure and postclosure functions. 
During receiving, loading, sealing, and emplacement the waste package is handled by or 
interfaces with non-nuclear handling system, SNF/HLW transfer system, emplacement and 
retrieval system, remediation system, and emplacement drift system in addition to the waste 
package closure system. These systems must comply with Section 3.1.3, Functional 
Requirement Number 3.1.3.1 of BSC (2003 [DIRS 1654271). The waste package passes through 
the Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt, Dry Transfer, Canister Handling, Remediation, and 
Subsurface Facilities. 
Performance Requirement Text 
Waste package sealing operations shall meet the requirements for the waste 
package as specified in the SDD for the waste package closure system. 
The waste package is handled initially by the trunnions on the trunnion collars. The trunnion 
collars are installed upon receipt and removed after the waste package is returned to the 
horizontal position on the pallet. The waste package is loaded and under goes closure in the 
vertical position. After the waste package is placed on an emplacement pallet it is transported to 
the designated drift for emplacement and the trunnion collar is returned for reuse. 
Applicability 
Yes 
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9. SUMMARY 
The report describes the physical configuration of the naval waste package, describes the waste 
forms that it accommodates, and demonstrates how it responds to event sequences and prevents 
release of radionuclides. Also included are summaries of the assessments of ionizing dose rates 
from the enclosed waste forms and postclosure closure performance assessments that provide 
information to Performance Assessment. The results are reasonable compared to the inputs and 
are suitable for the intended use of this analysis. Sources of uncertainty in the sources analyses 
are described and the effect on the results discussed. 
The design requirements and the supporting calculations are provided as justification for meeting 
each criterion in Section 7.1.2. An assessment of applicable design requirements for the naval 
waste package is summarized in Table 58 and are taken from BSC (2003 [DIRS 1654271). 
Table 58. Summary of Design Performance Requirements 
Functional 
Requirement 
Number 
3.1.1.1 
3.1.1.1 
3.1.1.1 
3.1.1.1 
3.1.1.1 
3.1.1.1 
3.1 .I .2 
3.1 .I .2 
3.1 .I .2 
Performance 
Requirement 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
Performance Requirement 
The sealed waste package shall not breach during normal 
operations or during credible preclosure event sequences. 
The waste package shall be designed and constructed to 
the codes and standards specified in the (Minwalla 2003 
[DIRS 1613621, Section 5.1 .I .) 
Normal operations and credible event sequence load 
combinations are defined in the (Minwalla 2003 [DIRS 
1613621, Table 5.1 .I-1). 
The waste package shall be designed to permit retrieval 
during the preclosure period until the completion of a 
performance confirmation program and Commission review 
of the information obtained from such a program. 
The waste package shall be designed to permit retrieval 
during the preclosure period so that any or all of the 
emplaced waste could be retrieved on a reasonable 
schedule starting at any time up to 50 years after waste 
emplacement operations are initiated, unless a different 
time period is approved or specified by the Commission. 
The waste package shall be designed to meet the full 
range of preclosure operating conditions for up to 300 
years after the final waste emplacement. 
In conjunction with natural barriers and other engineered 
barriers, the sealed waste package shall limit transport of 
radionuclides in a manner sufficient to meet long-term 
repository performance requirements. 
The waste package shall be designed and constructed to 
the codes and standards specified in Minwalla (2003 [DIRS 
1613621, Section 5.1 .I). 
Normal operations and event load combinations are 
defined in Minwalla (2003 [DIRS 1613621, Table 5.1.1-2). 
Comment 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
In progress. 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
In progress. 
Compliance 
demonstrated. 
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Functional Performance 
Requirement Requirement Performance Requirement Comment 
Number Number 
The methodology defined in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 
Program addendum (Mowbray 1999 [DIRS 1495851). Addressed by the 
3.1 .I .3 1 Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report Naval Nuclear (YMP 2003 [DIRS 1655051) shall be used to demonstrate Propulsion 
acceptable postclosure criticality control for canisters and Program. 
the waste packages in which they are disposed. 
The methodology defined in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Addressed by the Program letter (Griffith 2003 [DIRS 1651 751) shall be used Naval Nuclear 3.1 .I .3 2 to demonstrate acceptable preclosure criticality control for 
canisters and the waste packages in which they are Propulsion Program. disposed. 
Addressed by the 
3.1.1.3 3 The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will verify meeting Naval Nuclear the criticality criteria. Propulsion 
Program. 
The sealed waste package environment shall provide Addressed by the 
3.1 .I .4 1 conditions that maintain waste form characteristics that Naval Nuclear Propulsion 
restrict transport of radionuclides. Program. 
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will establish and Addressed by the 
3.1 .I .4 2 Naval Nuclear verify meeting the temperature limits for packages Propulsion 
containing naval fuel. Program. 
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will establish and Addressed by the 
3.1 .I .4 3 verify meeting short-term accident condition temperature Naval Nuclear limits (e.g., fire exposure) for packages containing naval Propulsion 
fuel. Program. 
Compliance 
demonstrated 
external to the 
naval SNF 
canister and 
3.1 .I .4 4 The waste form region of the sealed waste package shall addressed by the have an inert atmosphere with limited oxidizing agents. Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion 
Program internal 
to the naval SNF 
canister. 
Compliance 
demonstrated 
The waste package shall be designed to preclude external to the 
chemical, electrochemical, or other reaction (such as naval SNF 
internal corrosion) of the waste form so that there will be no canister and 
3.1.1.4 5 adverse effect on normal handling, storage, emplacement, addressed by the 
containment, isolation, or on abnormal occurrences such Naval Nuclear 
as a canister drop accident and premature failure in the Propulsion 
repository. Program internal . 
to the naval SNF 
canister. 
3.1 .I .5 1 The maximum waste package power at emplacement is Compliance 11.8 kW. demonstrated. 
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Functional Performance 
Requirement Requirement Performance Requirement Comment 
Number Number 
The naval short waste package shall accommodate a short 
3.1.2.1 1 (maximum 4.750 m [187.00 inches]) naval SNF canister Compliance 
with a maximum diameter of 1.689 m (66.5 inches) and demonstrated. 
made of stainless steel type 316L (UNS S31603). 
The naval long waste package shall accommodate a long 
3.1.2.1 2 (maximum 5.385 m [212.00 inches]) naval SNF canister, Compliance 
with a maximum diameter of 1.689 m (66.5 inches) and demonstrated. 
made of stainless steel type 316L (UNS S31603). 
3.1.2.1 3 The waste package shall accommodate a naval SNF Compliance 
canister with a maximum weight of 49 tons. demonstrated. 
The waste package shall accommodate a naval SNF 
3.1.2.1 4 canister with an axial and radial center-of-gravity range to Compliance 
be established by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. demonstrated. 
3.1.3.1 1 This issue is under investigation and will be resolved prior Under to construction authorization. investigation. 
Waste package sealing operations shall meet the 
3.1.3.2 1 requirements for the waste package as specified in the Under 
SDD for the waste package closure system. investigation. 
3.2.1.1 1 Performance requirements will be developed prior to Under license application. investigation. 
3.3.1.1 1 The waste package inner vessel shall have one lid and be Compliance 
made of stainless steel type 316 (UNS S31600). demonstrated. 
3.3.1.1 2 The waste package outer corrosion barrier shall have two Compliance lids and be made of Alloy 22 (UNS N06022). demonstrated. 
3.3.2 1 Performance requirements will be developed prior to Under license application. investigation. 
Waste Package and Components. Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 90 of 98 
10. REFERENCES 
[DlRS 1043 171 
ASM (American Society for Metals) 1980. Properties and Selection: Stainless Steels, Tool 
Materials and Special-Purpose Metals. Volume 3 of Metals Handbook. 9th Edition. Benjamin, 
D., ed. Metals Park, Ohio: American Society for Metals. TIC: 209801. 
[DIRS 1526551 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2001. Waste Package Outer Barrier Stress Due to Thermal 
Expansion with Various Barrier Gap Sizes. CAL-EBS-ME-000011 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.200112 12.0222. 
[DIRS 1623461 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2002. Naval Waste Package Drop with Emplacement Pallet. 
000-00C-DNFO-00100-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
MOL.20021118.0098. 
[DIRS 1654921 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2002. Static Waste Packages on Emplacement Pallet. ###-##C- 
EBS#-ool##-###-OA#. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
I MOL.20020801 .0132. 
[DIRS 161 8801 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2002. Swing-Down of Naval Long Waste Package. CAL-VDC- 
ME-000007 REV A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20020613.0483. 
[DIRS 1667951 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003.44-B WR Waste Package Tip-Over from an Elevated 
Surface. 000-00C-DSUO-01500-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20030904.0004. 
[DIRS 1650581 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. BSC Position on the Use of the ASME Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Code for the Yucca Mountain Waste Packages. 000-30R-WISO-00200-000-000. Las 
Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20030909.0054. 
[DIRS 1648541 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Design and Engineering, Naval Long Waste Package 
Conjiguration. 000-MWO-DNFO-00 101 -000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030929.0002. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 91 of 98 
[DIRS 1651581 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Design and Engineering, Naval Long Waste Package 
Configuration. 000-MWO-DNFO-00102-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030929.0003. 
[DIRS 1651591 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Design and Engineering, Naval Long Waste Package 
ConJiguration. 000-MWO-DNFO-00103-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030929.0004. 
[DIRS 1648551 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Design and Engineering, Naval Short Waste Package 
ConJiguration. 000-MWO-DNFO-00201-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030929.0005. 
[DIRS 165 1601 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Design and Engineering, Naval Short Waste Package 
ConJiguration. 000-MWO-DNFO-00202-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030929.0006. 
[DIRS 1651611 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Design and Engineering, Naval Short Waste Package 
ConJiguration. 000-MWO-DNFO-00203-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030929.0007. 
[DIRS 1654971 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Drop of Waste Package on Emplacement Pallet - A  Mesh 
Study. 000-00C-DSUO-02200-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.200309 15.000 1. 
[DIRS 1671671 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Long-Term Strategy of Analyses and Component Design 
Subproject. 000-30R-WISO-00300-000-001. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
MOL.20030922.0169 
[DIRS 1670811 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Naval SNF Long Waste Package 10 Degree Oblique Drop 
with Slap Down. 000-00C-DNFO-00500-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.2003 101 3.0002. 
[DIRS 16661 I] 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Naval SNF Long Waste Package Fabrication 
Specification. 000-3SS-DNFO-00100-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.2003 1024.0001. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 92 of 98 
[DIRS 1654271 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package System 
Description Document. 000-3YD-DN00-00100-000-002. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC 
Company. ACC: ENG.20030930.0002. 
[DIRS 1658951 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Object Drop on Naval Long Waste Package. 000-00C- 
DNFO-00600-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.2003 102 1.0007. 
[DIRS 164 1 281 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Preliminary Categorization of Event Sequences for 
License Application. CAL-MGR-RL-000002 REV OOA. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC 
Company. ACC: DOC.20030929.0010. 
[DIRS 165 1791 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Q-List. TDR-MGR-RL-000005 REV 00. Las Vegas, 
Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: DOC.20030930.0002. 
[DIRS 1647261 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Repository Twelve Waste Package Segment Thermal 
Calculation. 800-00C-WISO-00100-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030915.0003. 
[DIRS 16691 81 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Software Code: LS-DYNA. V.970.3858 D MPP. HP 
Itanium2, HP-UX 11.22. 10300-970.3858 D MPP-00 
[DIRS 1640751 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Thermal Evaluation of a 21 PWR Waste Package in the 
Shielded Surface Facility Transporter. 000-00C-DSUO-01300-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.200305 15.0001. 
[DIRS 1650931 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Two-Dimensional Repository Thermal Design 
Calculations. 000-00C-WISO-00300-000-00B. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20030630.0004. 
[DIRS 1631851 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Value Study Report- Waste Package Reevaluation. 000- 
3TS-EBSO-00100-000-000. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
MOL.20030327.0073. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 93 of 98 
[DIRS 1 6 16901 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Vertical Drop of Naval SNF Long Waste Package. 000- 
00C-DNFO-00200-000-OOA. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20030320.0001. 
[DIRS 1668271 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Vertical Lift of the Naval SNF Long Waste Package. 000- 
00C-DNFO-00300-000-OOA. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.2003 1 121.0001. 
[DIRS 1616911 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Waste Package Axial Thermal Expansion Calculation. 
000-00C-EBSO-00500-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20030416.0001. 
[DIRS 1670051 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Waste Package Outer Shell Stresses Due to Internal 
Pressure at Elevated Temperatures. 000-00C-EBSO-00600-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.20030430.0003. 
[DIRS 1 682 1 71 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Commercial SNF Waste Package Design Report. 000- 
00C-DSUO-02800-000-OOA. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. URN-1 130 
[DIRS 1671651 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Corner Drop of Naval Long Waste Package. 000-00C- 
DNFO-00700-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20040309.0033. 
[DIRS 1670821 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Dose Rate Calculation for the Naval Long Waste 
Package. 000-00C-DN00-00100-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: ENG.20040225.0006. 
[DIRS 1670781 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Horizontal Drop of Naval SNF Long Waste Package. 000- 
OOC-DNFO-01000-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20040301.0012. 
[DIRS 1670791 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Naval SNF Long Waste Package Tip-Over from an 
Elevated Surface. 000-00C-DNFO-00400-000-00.A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC 
Company. URN- 1 129 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 94 of 98 
[DIRS 167 1821 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Rock Fall on Waste Packages. 000-00C-MGRO-01400- 
000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.20040225.0012. 
[DIRS 1670831 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Structural Calculations of Waste Package Exposed to 
Vibratory Ground Motion. 000-00C-WISO-01400-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC 
Company. ACC: ENG.200402 17.0008. 
[DIRS 1666951 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Thermal Evaluation and Loading Study of 21-PWR Waste 
Package. 000-00C-DSUO-02600-000-00B. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20040120.0003. 
[DIRS 1670801 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Thermal Evaluation of the Naval Long Waste Package. 
000-00C-WISO-01200-000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20040113.0002. 
[DIRS 1672781 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004. Waste Package Closure System Description Document. 
100-3YD-HW00-00100-000-001. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.200403 10.002 1. 
[DIRS 1002241 
CRWMS M&O 1997. Determination of Waste Package Design ConJigurations. BBAA00000- 
01 71 7-0200-00017 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL. 19970805.03 10. 
[DIRS 1002591 
CRWMS M&O 1997. Waste Package Materials Selection Analysis. BBA000000-017 17-0200- 
00020 REV 01. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL. 19980324.0242. 
[DIRS 1578221 
CRWMS M&O 2000. Corner Drop of 21-PWR Waste Package. CAL-UDC-ME-000008 REV 
00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.20001113.0306. 
[DIRS 1493511 
CRWMS M&O 2000. Pressurized System Missile Impact on Waste Packages. CAL-EBS-ME- 
000006 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.20000420.0397. 
[DIRS 1381731 
CRWMS M&O 2000. Waste Package Containment Barrier Materials and Drip Shield Selection 
Report. B00000000-01717-2200-00225 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: 
MOL.20000209.0300. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 95 of 98 
[DIRS 1381921 
CRWMS M&O 2000. Waste Package Neutron Absorber, Thermal Shunt, and Fill Gas Selection 
Report. B00000000-017 17-2200-00227 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: 
MOL.20000209.0301. 
[DIRS 1584051 
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 2002. DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Information in Support of 
TSPA-SR. DOEISNFIREP-047, Rev. 2. Idaho Falls, Idaho: U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho 
Operations Office; TIC: 252089. 
[DIRS 1559701 
DOE (US. Department of Energy) 2002. Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic 
Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca 
Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. DOEIEIS-0250. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: MOL.20020524.03 14; through; 
MOL.20020524.0320. 
[DIRS 1629031 
DOE (US. Department of Energy) 2003. Quality Assurance Requirements and Description. 
DOEIRW-0333P, Rev. 13. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: DOC.20030422.0003. 
[DIRS 1651751 
Griffith, T.M. 2003. "Requested Information on Naval Spent Fuel for the Yucca Mountain 
Project License Application; Forwarding of, Reference: (a) Letter from Dyer to McKenzie dated 
November 20,2002." Letter from T.M. Griffith (DOE) to W.J. Arthur, I11 (DOEIORD), August 
4,2003, NR:RA:TMGriffith U#03-02468, with enclosure. ACC: MOL.20030911.0015. 
[DIRS 1553731 
Hallquist, J.O. 1998. LS-DMVA, Theoretical Manual. Livermore, California: Livermore Software 
Technology Corporation. TIC: 238997. 
[DIRS 1661471 
Hechmer, J.L. and Hollinger, G.L. 1998. 3 0  Stress Criteria Guidelines for Application. WRC 
Bulletin 429. New York, New York: Welding Research Council. TIC: 254432. 
[DIRS 1667991 
Herrera, M.; Ku, F.; and Tang, S. 2002. Calculation Package, Residual Stress Analyses on the 21 
PWR Mockup Waste Package Outer Shell Due to Quenching and General Corrosion Using a 
Side-Wall Thickness of 20mm. File No. TRW-06Q-3 19. [San Jose, California]: Structural 
Integrity Associates. ACC: MOL.20020925.0127. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 96 of 98 
[DIRS 1543501 
Kelmenson, R. 2000. "Meeting Summary, NRCDOE Technical Exchange Meeting on Container 
Life and Source Term (CLST), September 12-13,2000." E-mail from R. Kelmenson to C. 
Hanlon (DOEKMSCO), T. Gunter (DOEKMSCO), A. Gil (DOEtYMP), P. Russell 
(DOEKMSCO), September 27,2000, with attachment. ACC: MOL.20001127.0049. 
[DIRS 1546241 
Macheret, P. 2001. Waste Package Design Sensitivity Report. TDR-EBS-MD-000008 REV 01. 
Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20010313.0506. 
[DIRS 1580511 
McKenzie, J.M. 2001. Thermal Data for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Canister. Letter from J.M. McKenzie (Department of the Navy) to S.P. Mellington 
(DOE/YMSCO), August 29,2001, Ser 08Ul01-13933, with enclosure. ACC: 
MOL.20011029.0285. 
[DIRS 1661681 
Mecham, D.C. 2004. Waste Package Component Design Methodology Report. 000-30R-WISO- 
001 00-000-000. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.20040113.000 1. 
[DIRS 1613621 
Minwalla, H. J. 2003. Project Design Criteria Document. 000-3DR-MGRO-00 100-000-00 1. Las 
Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.20030402.0001. 
[DIRS 1495851 
Mowbray, G.E. 1999. Transmittal of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Addendum to the 
Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Office "Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report." Letter from G.E. Mowbray (Department of the Navy) to C.W. Reamer (NRC), 
October 29, 1999. ACC: MOL.200003 16.053 1. 
[DIRS 1099881 
Naples, E.M. 1999. Thermal, Shielding, and Structural Information on the Naval Spent Nuclear 
Fuel (SNF) Canister. Letter fi-om E.M. Naples (Department of the Navy) to D.C. Haught 
(DOEKMSCO), August 6, 1999, with enclosures. ACC: MOL. 19991 001 .0133. 
[DIRS 1540721 
Nicholas, T. 1980. Dynamic Tensile Testing of Structural Materials Using A Split Hopkinson Bar 
Apparatus. AFWAL-TR-80-4053. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: Air Force Wright 
Aeronautical Laboratories. TIC: 249469. 
[DIRS 1655051 
YMP (Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project) 2003. Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report. YMPITR-004Q, Rev. 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Yucca Mountain 
Site Characterization Office. ACC: DOC.2003 1 110.0005. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Pape 97 of 98 
CODES, STANDARDS, AND PROCEDURES 
[DIRS 1585351 
10 CFR 63. 2002. Energy: Disposal of High-level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository 
at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Readily available. 
[DIRS 1566711 
66 FR 55732. Disposal of High-level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at 
Yucca Mountain, NV, Final Rule. 10 CFR Parts 2, 19,20,21, 30,40, 51,60,61, 63, 70, 72,73, 
and 75. Readily available. 
[DIRS 1 020 1 61 
ANSI N14.6-1993. American National Standard for Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting 
Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More. New York, New 
York: American National Standards Institute. TIC: 236261. 
[DIRS 1650221 
AP-3.12Q, Rev. 2, ICN 1. Design Calculations and Analyses. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: 
DOC.20030827.0013. 
[DIRS 1581151 
ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) 2001.2001 ASME Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Code (includes 2002 addenda). New York, New York: American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers. TIC: 25 1425. 
[DIRS 1632741 
NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 2003. Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report. 
NUREG-1804, Rev. 2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. TIC: 254568. 
[DIRS 1016811 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. Readily available. 
[DIRS 1039361 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. Readily available. 
SOURCE DATA 
[DIRS 1640331 
M00306SDSAVDTH.000. Seismic Design Spectra and Acceleration, Velocity, and 
Displacement Time Histories for the Emplacement Level at 10-4 Annual Exceedance Frequency. 
Submittal date: 06/26/2003. 
Waste Package and Components Analysis 
Title: Naval Waste Package Design Report 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-DNFO-00800-000-00A Page 98 of 98 
[DIRS 167 1261 
M00312WHBDE104.001. Seismic Design Spectra and Time Histories for the Surface Facilities 
Area (Point DIE) at 10-4 Annual Exceedance Frequency. Submittal date: 12/12/2003. 
